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 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of how the value of irrigation 
water compares across regions in the United States. This is an issue arising with increasing 
frequency all over the country. The following four examples suggest the scope of the problem: In 
Arkansas, where a relatively small number of rice farmers have depleted the state's largest 
aquifer, the Army Corps of Engineers and state government have agreed to a controversial plan 
to spend more than $200 million in federal funds, or about $300,000 per farmer, on an irrigation 
project to prevent the aquifer from being drained dry. Opponents argue that this is an expensive 
subsidy to farmers who are growing a subsidized crop with the profligate use of a scarce 
resource. The Arkansas farmers contend that the government provides irrigation water to farmers 
in the west who have insufficient water resources and it ought to do the same for them in this 
case.
1
  
In Florida, the state‟s Water Management Districts have taken the state of Georgia to 
court over the amount of water that can be taken from rivers flowing into Florida‟s panhandle 
(Environmental Policy and Information Center 2002). The result is federally ordered negotiations 
to determine water allocations among Florida, Alabama, and Georgia. Negotiations have 
extended for three years beyond the one-year deadline as the states juggle the interests of dozens 
of different stakeholders.  
                                                 
1
 Jehl, Douglas.  “Arkansas Rice Farmers Run Dry, and U.S. Remedy Sets Off Debate” New York Times 
(November 11, 2002):A1. 
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In Texas, T. Boone Pickens is applying what he learned from corporate takeovers in the 
1980‟s to capitalize the value of water resources in the state. Water law in Texas states that 
ground water deposits under a property owner‟s land are completely at the disposal of the 
landowner. Mr. Pickens controls 150,000 acres in Roberts County, which accesses the giant 
Ogallala aquifer. Under current policy, Mr. Pickens could pump up to 60 billion gallons of water 
each year to as many as one million consumers in cities as far away as Dallas, Fort Worth, San 
Antonio and El Paso. Concerned by estimates that the aquifer could be depleted in 70 years, the 
Panhandle Ground Water Conservation District No. 3 has attempted, unsuccessfully, to cut Mr. 
Pickens‟ allocation in half.2   
In California, Howitt and Lund (1999) show that fallowed irrigated land offers one of the 
lowest cost and highest quantity sources of water supply for cities. Cities in California recently 
lost the right to millions of gallons of water from the Colorado River under a federally negotiated 
agreement since they were unable to reduce their water use during the scheduled time frame. 
Major cities have been trying to acquire water from farmers with large water rights, but 
negotiations stalled, possibly because the diminished flows into California could increase the 
value of the farmers‟ water rights.3 While many economists see smaller, more localized effects 
from fallowing agricultural land to supply cities with water, the common perception in the 
agricultural community of the economic impact of these water transfers is “pessimistic and 
foreboding” (Howe et al. 1990, p.1200). In studies of the economic impact of water transfers, the 
point is made repeatedly that losses that appear significant at the local level disappear as the 
scope of analysis broadens to the state or national level. As Howe et al. (1990) point out, 
 
                                                 
2
 Yardley, Jim. “For Texas Now, Water and Not Oil is Liquid Gold” New York Times, 6 April 2001. 
3
 McKinnon, Shaun “Feds restrict California water usage” The Arizona Republic. Dec. 17, 2002 
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“At the national level where the agricultural losses easily can be made up by 
expanded production in other states, the losses in the area of origin may appear totally 
inconsequential.”(p.1201) 
 
It may be true that as long as water transfers are occurring sporadically in a few western 
states then losses in agricultural production in a single county can be made up by increases in 
other counties or other states. But, what happens as more and more states react to the increasing 
pressure to re-allocate water from the agricultural sector to urban consumers and environmental 
needs?  Given the correspondence between areas with high-value crop production and fast urban 
growth, are farmers right to be concerned as water transfers out of agriculture become the norm? 
Will those states that resist such transfers gain an advantage in the production of high valued 
crops?  
These examples show that not only is water becoming an increasingly scarce and 
valuable resource, but also that these values have an important regional component. Each of 
these cases differs in who is deciding the allocation of water and therefore its value: In Arkansas, 
the state and federal government are doing a political and economic cost-benefit analysis of the 
irrigation project; in Florida, Alabama and Georgia, stakeholders are negotiating over water 
resources through state representatives; in Texas, legislators are deciding the extent to which 
markets (and T. Boone Pickens) will determine the disposition of water throughout the state; and 
in California imperfectly functioning markets are affecting the supply of water in the state.  
The debate over the use of water in the U.S. involves water‟s effect on agriculture, its 
effect on urban growth, the degree of environmental degradation, and the role of water in 
industrial uses.  Water use in the United States is divided among irrigation, electric-power 
generation, domestic consumption, industrial processing, and instream uses such as 
environmental protection, navigation, and recreation. Irrigation is the largest user, accounting for 
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153 million acre-feet (maf) of withdrawals, followed by thermoelectric (146 maf), domestic 
consumption (52 maf), and industrial uses (28 maf) (Gollehon 2003, 68).  When measuring 
consumptive water use, where water is not returned to the immediate water environment, 
irrigation accounts for 85 maf, or 81% of the U.S. total (Gollehon 2003, 70).  
Because water is not a homogeneous good, there is no reason to think that its value would 
be similar across industries.  In domestic use, for example, potable water must be delivered to 
(and removed from) millions of individual households. Thus its value includes purification, 
transportation and disposal costs. Water in this case can be considered a final consumer good. 
Since each consumer uses relatively little water compared to a farmer, diminishing marginal 
utility implies relatively higher water values in domestic use.
4
  Allocating these resources in a 
socially equitable or economically efficient manner is difficult without competitive markets to 
determine (and to make public) the value of a resource to its users.    
The competitiveness of U.S. agriculture in part depends on the availability, pricing, and 
quality of water. Many import- and export-competing agricultural commodities are produced 
under irrigation. In the United States, due to the growth in urbanization and environmental 
demands, transfers of water out of agriculture are growing at a dramatic pace (Howitt and Lund 
1999; Colby 1990; and Griffin 1998). As more and more states react to the increasing pressure to 
re-allocate water from agriculture to urban consumers and to environmental maintenance, 
farmers are concerned that the loss of water will increase production costs and decrease their 
ability to compete in international markets.  
The emerging environmental agenda pits environmental water needs, which are protected 
by law, against urban consumers, who are willing to pay the most for water, and farmers, who 
                                                 
4
 Residential customers pay for water by the gallon, whereas farmers measure water in units of acre feet, cubic 
meters per second, or millions of gallons per day. One acre foot equals 325,851 gallons, and one cubic meter per 
second equals a flow of 264.2 gallons per second. 
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are the largest water users. This competition for water takes place under a diverse framework of 
water laws that range from appropriative rights with water markets in California, to riparian right 
in the mid-west, to state-owned water rights in Florida. The result is an extremely difficult 
problem in the efficient allocation of water. In spite of the political nature of water, one can still 
empirically estimate the consequences of allocating water across regions with different 
agricultural markets, climates, and geographies, each with different property-right scenarios, 
recognizing that the solution chosen by policymakers may not be the most economically 
efficient.  
Regions with functioning water markets should see water resources moving toward an 
efficient allocation between farmers and residential consumers; although water markets do not 
themselves allocate water to environmental purposes. In Colorado, 80 percent of all water 
transfers are from agricultural uses to non-agricultural uses (Colby, 1990 p. 1189). In the Rio 
Grande Valley in Texas essentially all transfers move water out of agriculture (Griffin, 1998). In 
areas without water markets the burden of allocating water falls to water management boards. 
The state of Florida is exemplary in this regard, since the state owns all water resources. Under 
Florida law, each of five water management districts is charged with allocating water to the 
maximum benefit of the people of Florida – under the constraint that they must exhaust local 
water resources before seeking sources outside of the water management district. The result is 
cities paying for water desalination plants that have supply costs two to three times higher than 
the pumping costs of farmers irrigating 44,000 acres in the same county. As urban populations 
grow, and with the environment increasingly stressed, the political pressure to re-allocate water 
resources away from farmers will mount.  
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Within the simplest context, agriculture in the United States will continue to use water up 
until the point where the marginal value product of water equals its marginal input price.  
Unfortunately, this simple statement belies the complexity of the problem.  Estimating the 
marginal value product of water in agriculture is highly problematic.  In addition, it is difficult to 
define the “price” of water, owing to the variety of property rights regimes observed in the 
United States, and different sources of supply each with different costs.  This study proposes to 
estimate the marginal value of water in agriculture across regions in the U.S., and to test whether 
these values are consistent with the efficient use of irrigation water.  
This study should fill four gaps in the literature. First, it provides comprehensive and 
consistent estimates of water values across the United States. These values are based on farmers‟ 
optimizing behavior over a full choice set of outputs (including vegetables and orchards as well 
as field crops) and inputs (fuels, chemicals, labor, and other inputs). While there are many 
estimates of the value of water in agriculture, there are very few estimates of those values across 
regions. Ruttan‟s (1965) work remains the only attempt at uniform estimates of water values in 
both eastern and western regions.  
Several studies have found that water values and water demand vary by region.  Moore et 
al. (1994b) estimate the demand for water across regions by combining a discreet choice model 
with a profit maximizing model that treats land as a fixed allocatable input. They find that 
changes in crop allocation explain how the quantity demanded for water changes in response to 
changes in the price of water. These changes in crop allocation are consistent with intuition in 
some cases (i.e. an increase in water price causes less acreage to be allocated to a crop when that 
crop is water intensive) but not in others. They also find that these responses vary significantly 
by region. One limitation to Moore et al. and another excellent study, Schaible (1997), is that 
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they limit their analyses to farmers growing field crops exclusively due to the complexity of 
disaggregated data on vegetables. Their inability to include vegetables in farmers‟ profit 
maximizing choice sets is a major drawback.  
Second, this study tests whether institutional elements, production choices, and/or 
geographical factors explain regional differences in water demand. If water values do not vary 
significantly by region after controlling for these factors, then the implication is that irrigation 
water is being allocated efficiently among farmers. Schaible (1997) suggests that the proportion 
of high value crops in a region is a significant factor in regional differences in the value of water.  
Gardner (1983) tests this directly and finds vegetables and other high value crops are more likely 
to be grown in regions with high water costs, despite their intensive use of water. One reason for 
this is that the value of irrigation as a method to reduce uncertainty in production is higher in 
vegetables and orchards. While these studies attribute differences in water demand to differences 
in aquifers,  the value of crops, production technology, and the availability of surface water, etc.  
the role of these factors is not tested directly.  This model directly tests which of these factors, if 
any, explain the variation in water values. 
Third, it explores the effect of agricultural policies on the regional value of water. By 
modeling water values as a function of crop prices, the affect of policy changes on those prices 
can be traced back to their effects on water values. Two specific policies are considered: The 
effect of federal subsidies on field crops, and a decline in vegetable prices due to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Regional variation in these effects also is 
determined. Finally, this study considers whether farmers are using water efficiently in regions 
with functioning water markets, and whether the cost of pumping water is a reasonable estimate 
of its shadow price. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 The Value of Water 
Every student of B-grade movies is familiar with the scene of treasure-seekers who, 
dying of thirst in the desert, beg to trade fist-sized diamonds for a sip of water. Every student of 
economics is aware that this apparent paradox provides a useful lesson in marginal value and 
scarcity. As Renzetti (2002) points out, a more-subtle lesson lies in how the values of these two 
products are determined. There are similarities in that the values of both depend on quantity and 
quality. Also, both act as final and intermediate goods, with the highest quality products used by 
consumers (in the case of diamonds, it is the value of jewelry versus drill bits, and for water it is 
drinking-water versus irrigation.)  
On the other hand, there are a number of factors that make it far more difficult to 
determine a value for water than for diamonds. One important factor is the lack of an efficient 
national market for water. Not surprisingly, many of the obstacles to market formation also make 
it inherently difficult to value water.  Water resources have the nonrivalry and nonexcludability 
characteristics of public goods (Saliba and Bush, 1987). The supply of water frequently exhibits 
high and declining average fixed costs, thereby creating conditions for imperfect competition 
(Saliba and Bush, 1987). Uncertainty in supply and demand can cause inefficient risk-averting 
behavior (Willis and Wittlesley, 1998). In addition, institutional arrangements and infrastructure 
constraints can generate externalities (Beare et al. 1998).  
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2.1.1  Quantity of Water 
Defining the quantity of water used is complicated since water may be withdrawn from 
surface flows (or pumped from groundwater), used, and then returned. The consumption of 
water, the difference between the amount withdrawn and the amount returned, is different from 
the amount withdrawn or applied.  For example, the thermoelectric industry consumed just 3% of 
the water it withdrew in 1990, while irrigation consumed 56 percent of its water withdrawals due 
to evaporation and transpiration (Gollehon, 2003).  The fraction of water not consumed is 
nonrival, in that more than one consumer can use the same water. Recreational and 
environmental uses of instream flows are frequently cited examples (Saliba and Bush, 1987). 
Faddali and Shaw (1998) investigate whether using a lake to bank water for agriculture 
might become economically feasible if the value of the lake for recreation and wildlife 
enhancements were taken into account. This issue directly affects the value of water when states 
try to determine who owns the water that is conserved from withdrawals. Does the water belong 
to the conserver or to those who have historically benefited from the downstream flow? There is 
no clear consensus among states on how to answer this question (Brown et al. in Weatherford, 
1982). 
 
2.1.2  Location 
There are also important considerations of location. Since water is bulky in relation to its 
value, transportation costs are a relevant consideration when comparing in-stream uses to off-
stream uses. (Gibbons, 1986) Humanity has a long history of moving water from areas where it 
is abundant and relatively cheap to areas where it is scarce and valuable. Examples range from 
Roman aqueducts crisscrossing southern Europe, to the Incas in Peru who were moving water 
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from the mountains to the valleys when the Spanish arrived 400 years ago. In the U.S., water is 
routed from the Colorado River all the way to Los Angeles, California. The Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR) has built hundreds of dams to provide irrigation throughout the country. 
Many of the BOR‟s irrigation projects are controversial precisely because of the possibility that 
the total cost of providing irrigation water exceeds the benefit to farmers. In fact, many studies of 
water value have been undertaken explicitly to determine whether the BOR is subsidizing 
farmers.  In terms of transporting water, the vast majority of BOR irrigation projects do not move 
water outside of a water basin. Important exceptions are the lower Colorado River, the Trinity 
River, the Colombia River and the Rio Grande.
5
 
 
2.1.3  Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the timing of water also affects its value. Floods and droughts are obvious 
examples, but there is a large literature on the optimal timing of irrigation (examples are Yaron 
and Dinar 1982, and Barry 1984). When facing stochastic plant-water needs and uncertain water 
supply, Willis and Wittlesley (1998) show that a risk-averse farmer will tend to over-use water 
relative to a risk-neutral farmer, at the same time that he under-estimates likely water supplies. 
The effect of this in markets is to add a risk-premium to the price of water. Beare et al. (1998) 
calculate a two- to fourfold increase in the opportunity cost of water due to seasonal uncertainty. 
Differences in risk-aversion between farmers and cities enable cities in the West to insure against 
water shortfalls by buying farmers‟ rights to water during periods of drought.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 From an interview with Noel Gollehon of Economic Research Service of the USDA, June 11, 2003. 
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2.1.4  Institutional Factors 
Finally, water is subject to institutional factors that affect its allocation and value. State 
water law doctrines that define property rights and the transferability of water are key among 
these. There are five basic types of water rights; riparian rights, appropriative rights, use permits, 
allotments, and mutual stock. Riparian rights, inherited from English common law, were the 
basis for the first system of water law in the United States (Schmandt, Smerdon and Clarkson, 
1988, p.4, and Saliba and Bush, 1987, p.57).  Under this system, lakes and streams are 
considered private waters and the owner of land adjacent to the water has the right to make 
“reasonable use” of it. The water is available for use only on the adjacent land and may not be 
transferred. Some states have restricted this right so that one‟s use must not interfere with other 
uses and adequate flow must be maintained. Because riparian rights tie water to the land, water 
values in this system are more likely to be capitalized in the price of the land. Riparian rights 
form the basis of most water law in states east of the Mississippi. This system is consistent with 
water use permits that regulate water quality and waste (Schmandt, Smerdon and Clarkson, 1988, 
p.4).  Water use permits usually are issued for groundwater withdrawals. They usually are not 
ranked by priority, they are not granted in perpetuity, nor are they subject to beneficial use 
restrictions.  
Appropriative rights evolved in the arid regions of the western United States where water 
frequently was transported long distances from its source to the place of use, for example for 
mining or urban water supply (Schmandt, Smerdon and Clarkson, 1988, p.4, and Saliba and 
Bush, 1987, p.57). Appropriative rights are usually subject to two provisions. One is “beneficial 
use” where if one uses water “wastefully” the right may be reduced or lost. The other is “first in 
time first in right” where water rights are prioritized according to the date when water was first 
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appropriated. Senior right holders have preferred access to water relative to more junior holders. 
Appropriative rights usually are assigned to specific lands or purposes, but, with certain 
limitations, may be transferred to other lands or purposes.  While the limitations to transfers vary 
by state they usually concern third-party impacts, issues of consumptive water use, and whether 
the right is tied to the land (Schmandt, Smerdon and Clarkson, 1988, and Saliba and Bush, 
1987). 
The allotment system is based on a contractual agreement to deliver a certain flow of 
water (usually from public projects). Allotments divide a water resource among users according 
to an agreed-upon formula devised by a governing water board, interstate compact or 
negotiations among agencies (Saliba and Bush, 1987, 58). Examples of allotments include the 
Central Valley Project and the State Water Project in California. Mutual stocks are similar to 
allotments in that they represent claims to water supplied by an organization. Mutual irrigation 
company stock, for example, is a collection of appropriative water rights that are jointly 
managed. Such joint management can facilitate the transfer of water rights from farmers to cities 
during periods of drought, thereby increasing the value of the right. 
 
2.2  The Value of Water in Agriculture 
In agriculture, the value of irrigation water is derived from the value of the crops to 
which it is applied. Water is used to regulate crop temperature and to leach salt from soils, in 
addition to crop irrigation. The decision to irrigate is based on the change in profit discounted 
over the life of the investment. The marginal value of water is the change in profit from applying 
an additional effective unit of water over some portion of the irrigated acreage.  The value can be 
long run or short run, and for mixed crops or a single crop (Gibbons, 1986). Effective water is 
 13 
 
 
determined by the amount of water that reaches plants‟ root systems. While this is the most 
accurate measure of water use, it is only measured on controlled plots of land. The two most 
common measures of water use are: water application, which is water applied to crops, including 
water lost to evaporation and runoff, and water withdrawal, which is total water diverted from 
surface sources or pumped from groundwater (Gollehon and Quinby, 2000). Other factors that 
affect the value of water in agriculture are climate, soil quality and irrigation technique (Caswell 
and Zilberman, 1985, Dinar and Zilberman, 1991).  
Frederick, VandenBerg and Hanson (1996) report 177 values for irrigation water 
collected from 23 studies. These estimates include marginal values from analyses of water 
production functions and average values from linear programming models of farm budgets. 
These values differ by crop, by location, and year. All values have been converted into 1994 
dollars using the GDP deflator. Most of these studies values are based on linear programming 
models and farm budget analysis. Regionally, values range from zero dollars per acre-foot to 
over a thousand dollars per acre-foot in the lower Colorado and the Pacific Northwest (see table 
2.1). Every region with more than one reported value had a minimum value of water of zero 
dollars. According to Lynne (1978), a zero marginal value product for water suggests that 
farmers may be following the advice of agricultural extension officers to apply water to 
maximize crop yield, or they may be reacting to the non-excludable nature of a common property 
resource. As can be seen in table 2.2, water values for the production of a specific crop also vary 
widely. The lowest values are $5 per acre-foot for sorghum, and $9 per acre-foot for barley. The 
highest water value is $1,228 per acre-foot for potatoes, followed by $686 per acre-foot for 
tomatoes.  
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Table 2.1 . Water Values for Irrigation by Region, ($/Acre –foot) 
Resource  
Region 
 
Average 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Number of 
Values 
Mid-Atlantic 198 198 198 1 
S. Atlantic-Gulf 20 57 0 5 
Tennessee 19 19 19 1 
Upper MI 10 41 0 4 
Lower MI 21 50 0 3 
Souris-Red-
Rainy 
0 0 0 1 
Missouri 18 77 0 17 
AK-White-Red 49 113 0 10 
Texas-Gulf 81 199 0 20 
Rio Grande 33 107 0 8 
Upper CO 5 18 0 4 
Lower CO 88 1,071 0 60 
Great Basin 0 0 0 4 
Pacific NW 143 1,228 0 18 
California 111 756 0 21 
Frederick, VandenBerg and Hanson (1996). 
 
Table 2.2. Water Values by Crop, ($/Acre-foot) 
 
Crop 
 
Average 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Number of 
Values 
Alfalfa 51 44 173 18 13 
Apples 151 151 151 151 1 
Barley 33 39 62 9 7 
Beans 58 58 72 44 2 
Carrots 550 550 550 550 1 
Corn 91 98 134 44 7 
Cotton 114 103 292 28 18 
Grain Sorgham 57 44 199 5 11 
Hay 36 36 49 23 2 
Lettuce 208 208 208 208 1 
Melons 54 54 70 37 2 
Onions 40 40 40 40 1 
Pears 137 137 137 137 1 
Potatoes 781 784 1,228 46 4 
Rice 86 86 86 86 1 
Safflower 53 58 69 26 4 
Soybeans 121 127 178 60 3 
Sugar Beets 121 119 253 39 8 
Tomatos 686 686 686 686 1 
Vegetables 206 206 206 206 1 
Wheat 51 47 104 14 13 
Frederick, VandenBerg and Hanson (1996). 
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2.3  Economic Models of Water Value 
Models to calculate the value of irrigation water can be divided into five categories: 
maximum willingness to pay based on linear programming analysis of farm budgets; the value of 
the marginal physical product of water based on a water production functions; hedonic 
estimation based on land sales; maximization models of the demand for water; and regional 
models of water demand. 
 
2.3.1  Farm Budget Analysis 
Farm budget analysis was a prominent method for estimating water values between the 
1960‟s and the 1980‟s. Gibbons (1986) discusses many of these studies in detail. Using this 
technique, maximum willingness to pay for water is the residual left when total input costs 
(except water) are subtracted from total crop revenue. Dividing by the amount of water gives the 
maximum average value of water. Linear programming techniques are used to determine a 
demand schedule for water by maximizing farm returns given constraints on crop acreages, crop 
prices, unit costs, and water requirements. Average water values are obtained by solving a series 
of linear programs that differ in the cost of water. The solutions specify the crops and input 
levels (including water) that maximize net farm returns, thereby providing a quantity demanded 
for water at each price.  
The stepwise nature of the demand schedules is based on a mix of crops with different 
water requirements. As water costs rise, less profitable crops are dropped from production. A 
variation on this technique allows the supply of water to increase with a concomitant increase in 
less-valuable or more water-intensive crops. The value calculated is the maximum marginal 
value of an additional unit of water.  Schaible (1993) estimates a sophisticated, linear quadratic 
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programming model that incorporates land and water as fixed allocatable inputs. The model 
distinguishes between privately supplied water resources and Bureau of Reclamation water 
supplies in order to estimate the elasticity of water demand by source of supply in the Pacific 
Northwest. He finds that regional-specific factors such as the availability of surface water versus 
groundwater, allocations of high-valued crops versus field crops, and water management 
regulations concerning groundwater pumping all affect the elasticity of demand for water. 
Estimated elasticities, however are all less than one. 
Gibbons (1986 p.41) points out several limitations of these studies. First, these studies 
assume specific water needs by crop. This need not be a problem if water needs are specified 
according to soil quality, irrigation technique, and other determinants of local water use. In 
addition, water values depend heavily on crop prices and non-water input costs. If federal 
subsidies inflate output prices or deflate input prices, then water values will be inflated also. A 
more difficult factor to capture is when federal programs inflate the effective value of a crop, and 
therefore farmers‟ behavior, without directly changing prices. To the extent that water costs are 
negligible, the incentive to over-use water to capture economic rents is significant.  
 
2.3.2  Marginal Physical Product of Water 
The value of water can be estimated based on its direct physical effect on the output of a 
crop. A crop production function expresses the mathematical relationship among levels of inputs 
and outputs. The derivative of this function with respect to water, the marginal physical product 
of water, expresses how much an incremental increase in irrigation will affect crop yield when 
other inputs are held constant. The revenue from the increased output can be interpreted as the 
value of the additional water.  Ideally, the estimated production function would include all the 
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relevant inputs, and these inputs would be both homogenous and observable. These data 
requirements are so demanding that most production function estimates are based on data from 
controlled experiments on test plots (Gibbons, 1986). Farm survey data, on the other hand, 
usually provide single-point estimates of input-output relationships. Time series data is useful in 
expanding the number of observations, but it also introduces the possibility of changes in input 
characteristics (e.g. the weather) over time.  
Hexem and Heady (1978) provide an extensive analysis of this technique with estimates 
of water production functions for corn, wheat, cotton, and sugar beets. Funded by the Bureau of 
Reclamation for a three-year project, Hexem and Heady collect data from multiple test plots for 
each crop over a three-year period. In order to capture the interactive effects between water and 
other inputs, they vary the application of fertilizer as well as water. In an effort to make the 
production functions more general, they control for differences in rainfall, hours of daylight, 
temperature, soil characteristics and the functional form of the relationship. Plugging the 
estimated production function into a profit function, and applying the profit-maximizing rule that 
the marginal value product of an input equals its price, Hexem and Heady determine the crop-
specific derived demand for water. For example, the derived demand for water to irrigate corn in 
Kansas shows that the value of 35 acre-inches of water is worth $2 per acre-inch when 180 
pounds of nitrogen are applied per acre, but those same inches of water are worth less than $1 
per acre-inch when 90 pounds of nitrogen are applied (Hexem and Heady, 1978, p.189). 
One problem with this approach, especially for regional analysis, is that it is very 
specific. Values differ for each crop, in each location, and for every additional input. Due to the 
number of additional test plots necessary to control for several inputs, it is impossible to replicate 
the conditions of a working farm. Indeed, all these results are based on optimal field tests for a 
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single crop, rather than farmers‟ profit-maximizing decisions over a variety of possible crop 
mixes and inputs.  
There are studies that estimate agricultural production functions using actual production 
data, (Ball et al. 2001, Ball 1985, Christensen and Jorgenson 1970), but data difficulties limit the 
number of studies that include water as a factor (see for example, Lee and Howitt (1996)). There 
is no market input price for water, which precludes the use of water in a price index.  Also, data 
linking the application of water to a particular crop is difficult to find, so use of a quantity index 
is prohibited as well. Omitting water as a variable in production, however, overestimates the 
productive contribution of related factors such as land, labor and intermediate assets. 
 
2.3.3  Hedonic Estimation 
The hedonic approach to valuing water is based on the idea that when a person buys a 
product he is actually buying the bundled attributes of that product. If the effect of each of these 
attributes can be disaggregated, the implicit value of each attribute can be determined. In the 
market for a parcel of land, the attributes include its location, investments in buildings, the 
quality of its soil, its access to water, and so on.  Dunford et al. (1985) explain that in addition to 
its own attributes, the value of a parcel of rural land also depends on external factors (such as 
interest rates, and federal subsidies), expectations about the future (prices, population growth, re-
zoning, etc), and individual characteristics of buyers and sellers (age, level of expertise, familial 
relations.) The assumptions inherent in this analysis are that the observations of land sales are 
from a single market in which consumers have identical preferences, income, and full 
information.  
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There are relatively few hedonic analyses of water value. The two most recent are 
Veeman et al. (1997), and Faux and Perry (1999). Veeman et al. (1997) use hedonic analysis to 
determine water values in southeast Alberta, Canada. They find that in a straight comparison 
irrigated land, on average, sells for $325 ($213 US real 1992 dollars at 1997 exchange rates) 
more per acre than non-irrigated land. After testing for functional form and market segmentation, 
they regress the price per acre of land on: access to water, the value of buildings on the land, the 
size of the parcel, and proximity to a large city and a very large city. Therefore, correcting for the 
effects of other attributes, access to irrigation water is worth $190 per acre ($125 US). Access to 
water increases the value of land by an average of 35%. Assuming an average water application 
rate of 1.5 acre feet per acre, they determine that the average value of water per acre foot is $126 
($83 US). This is the perennial value per acre-foot since they do not discount the value over the 
life of the water right. 
Faux and Perry (1999) develop a somewhat more sophisticated hedonic model to estimate 
the marginal value of water in Malheur County, Oregon. They estimate a linear Box Cox model 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. One improvement in their model is that rather than have a single 
measure of soil quality for each parcel of land, they determine the acreage in each parcel that 
falls into seven classes of soil quality. Class 1 is the most productive soil and Class 7 is the 
lowest quality soil. Because precipitation in the region is far below the level necessary to grow 
pasture grass, all non-irrigated land is classified as Class 6 regardless of soil quality. Class 5 is 
the lowest quality soil with irrigation. The estimated coefficients on Classes 1 through 5 measure 
the effect on the sale price of the land of irrigating that quality of soil. The coefficient on Class 6 
measures the effect of not having access to water. Therefore the marginal value of water on the 
lowest quality land is measured as the difference between the implicit value of Class 5 land and 
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the implicit value of Class 6 land. In addition to the seven soil classes, the final model includes 
variables for building values, residential buildings, distance to the nearest cities, and a time trend. 
Faux and Perry (1999) find that the combination of irrigation and improving soil quality 
has a sharply increasing effect on sale prices. The first row in table 2.3 shows that the estimated 
value of the lowest quality irrigated land (Class 5) is $881 per acre, which increases to $2,918 for 
irrigated land with the highest quality soil. The second row shows that non-irrigated land is 
worth $367 per acre. The marginal value of water is calculated in the third row by subtracting the 
second row from the first. Thus $514 is the marginal value of moving from no irrigation to 
irrigating land with the lowest quality soil. This row indicates how the marginal value of water 
would increase as water is relegated to higher quality land due to higher procurement costs or 
lower quantities of supply.  
The values discussed above are essentially the value of using irrigation. Faux and Perry 
determine the annual value of water per acre-foot by discounting the marginal values at a 6% 
discount rate over an infinite time horizon, and then dividing by an average of 3.5 acre-feet of 
water applied per acre. These values are reported in the final row, where the annual value of 
water per acre-foot ranges from $9 to $44 depending on the soil quality. Faux and Perry point out 
that it is inappropriate to attribute all the increased value of irrigating high-quality land to water. 
If water is mobile, then its marginal value is the value added to the lowest quality land when it is 
irrigated, which is $514. On the other hand, since Class 6 land groups many different soil 
qualities, all of which are unproductive entirely because they are non-irrigated, the specific 
effects of irrigating different quality soils are masked.  
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Table 2.3. Value of Irrigation Water in Malheur County (in dollars). 
 Land Class 
  5 4 3 2 1 
Value of irrigated land per acre 881 962 1,489 2,100 2,918 
Value of non-irrigated land per acre 367 367 367 367 367 
Value of water per acre 514 595 1,122 1,743 2,551 
Annual value of water per acre/a 31 36 67 105 153 
Value of water per acre-foot perennially/b 147 170 321 495 729 
Value of water per acre-foot delivered one time/a,b 9 10 19 30 44 
a/ Based on a 6% discount rate and infinite time horizon. 
b/ Based on an average annual water delivery of 3.5 acre-feet per acre. 
Faux and Perry (1999). 
 
The underlying problem is that these hedonic models do not isolate other factors that 
effect productivity. To the extent that land values depend on future income streams, if other 
factors that affect that income (such as crop mix, irrigation technology, or farmers‟ experience)  
are correlated with water use, then estimated water values may capture the effects of these other 
factors – just as they do for soil quality. As Coelli et al. (1991) explain, hedonic analysis could 
isolate the effects of these other factors by regressing the estimated implicit price of water on the 
characteristics of the buyers and/or the sellers. While data limitations tend to prevent this second 
stage analysis, estimating the effects of other factors of production on the value of water would 
be useful. 
Torrell, Libbin and Miller (1990) address one of these problems by including estimates of 
farm income in a hedonic model. They became motivated to estimate the value of the water in 
the Ogallala aquifer underlying each farm, when a Federal Court ruled that landowners are 
entitled to a cost depletion allowance in their taxes due to the exhaustion of their capital 
investment in the groundwater. The study uses a combination of hedonics and expected income 
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to estimate the value of water resources in the Ogallala aquifer in New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska between 1979 and 1986.  
It is hypothesized that the price of irrigated land is equal to the discounted returns from 
the water resource, plus the discounted returns of the irrigated land, plus the discounted returns 
from dryland farming once the water resource is exhausted, plus the value of the attributes of the 
land. If it can be assumed that the return to dryland is identical to the return from irrigated land 
with no water, then the value of the water resource equals the difference between the price of 
irrigated land (which accounts for future rents) and the price of dryland with identical 
characteristics.  To determine this difference Torell et al. estimate two hedonic price models, one 
for dryland prices and one for irrigated prices. The dryland model includes variables for the 
value of buildings, the size of the plot, a time trend, a state-specific time trend, farm earnings, 
and precipitation. The irrigated model replaces the precipitation variable with net irrigation 
requirements and characteristics of the aquifer below the farm (depth to the aquifer, amount of 
water in the aquifer, and the recharge rate.)  
Torell et al. find that, contrary to earlier studies, aquifer attributes and farm income have 
a significant effect on land values. They attribute this result to the larger geographic area of this 
study, which allows for greater variation in factors of production. In smaller areas there may not 
be enough variation in crop mixes and aquifers to have a significant effect on land values. As can 
be seen in table 2.4, the value of irrigated land fell substantially during the 1980‟s in absolute 
terms (as all land values have fallen), but prices also fell relative to the price for non-irrigated 
land.   
The price wedge between irrigated and non-irrigated land is greatest in arid New Mexico  
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Table 2.4. Average Value of Water In-Storage By State ($/Acre-Foot). 
  New 
Mexico
a
 
 
Oklahoma
a 
Colorado 
North
b 
Colorado 
South
a
 
 
Kansas
a 
 
Nebraska 
 
Average 
Water Value as % of Total Irrigated Farmland Price (%) 
1979 66 49 78 67 51 31 57 
1980 63 41 70 54 45 33 51 
1981 63 37 63 41 40 35 47 
1982 64 34 61 36 40 39 46 
1983 68 39 62 34 43 41 48 
1984 65 34 61 30 41 41 45 
1985 61 31 61 30 39 39 44 
1986 57 32 67 39 43 32 45 
Average 64 38 66 44 43 37 48 
Value of Water ($/acre of irrigated farmland) 
1979 579 431 1,004 567 467 429 580 
1980 610 325 878 437 432 542 537 
1981 639 271 749 312 386 633 498 
1982 648 224 668 238 365 695 473 
1983 657 226 615 193 349 688 455 
1984 603 187 571 156 308 610 406 
1985 530 168 569 154 266 476 361 
1986 442 193 622 200 253 285 329 
Average 589 251 710 282 353 545 455 
Value of Water ($/acre-foot of saturated thickness) 
1979 7.66 2.54 7.62 5.94 3.07 2.29 4.85 
1980 8.24 1.93 6.69 4.58 2.87 2.88 4.53 
1981 8.89 1.63 5.73 3.28 2.61 3.38 4.25 
1982 9.20 1.36 5.14 2.52 2.49 3.71 4.07 
1983 9.49 1.39 4.73 2.06 2.40 3.65 3.95 
1984 8.84 1.16 4.41 1.68 2.12 3.23 3.57 
1985 7.87 1.05 4.41 1.66 1.85 2.51 3.22 
1986 6.64 1.09 4.85 2.18 1.77 1.49 3.00 
Average 8.35 1.52 5.45 2.99 2.40 2.89 3.93 
a
South of the Republican River. 
b
North of the Republican River. 
Torrell, Libbin and Miller (1990). 
 
and northern Colorado where irrigated land sold for three and four times the price of non-
irrigated land in 1980. In Nebraska, where there are more feasible options for dryland farming, 
irrigated land sold for 50% more than non-irrigated land. On average, the net present value of 
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water per irrigated acre is $455, which is 48% of the total irrigated farmland price per acre. This 
amounts to $3.93 per acre-foot of saturated water thickness in the aquifer. Comparing these 
results to those reported in Gibbons (1986), Torell et al. calculate that a value of $15 per acre-
foot for water used in the production of wheat in New Mexico would have to be discounted at a 
rate of 3.5% over the expected 37 years before depletion of the aquifer in order to equal their 
estimated net present value of $610 per irrigated acre. Discounting at 6% would result in a net 
present value of $442 for water in the aquifer. 
 For purposes of this study, the hedonic model has some problems. It does a better job 
estimating the value of having access to water than the value of water applied to the land. Both 
Veeman et al. (1997) and Faux and Perry (1999) assume a fixed amount of water is applied 
uniformly per acre across the region and over time. Clearly the amount of water applied will vary 
according to crop mix, irrigation method, rainfall, pumping costs, and other farm attributes. This 
problem could be ameliorated if the amount of water applied per acre was used in place of a 
dummy variable for irrigation. Hedonic models also assume all sales take place in a single 
market, which may not be a reasonable assumption across regions. 
 
2.3.4  Maximization Models 
One of the earliest attempts to explain the value marginal product of water across regions 
using economic optimization was by Vernon Ruttan in 1965.  Using 1954 Census data 
aggregated to the county level, Ruttan estimates Cobb-Douglas production functions where the 
total value of farm products sold in a county are a function of farm workers, operating expenses 
(feed, fertilizer and lime), value of machinery, value of livestock, irrigated acres and non-
irrigated acres. By setting the value marginal product of irrigated land equal to its cost, and 
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fixing regional output in the termination year of 1980, Ruttan attempts to project irrigated 
acreage through the year 1980. While there are flaws in the analysis, Ruttan offered an 
alternative approach to previous water production functions based on experimental test plots by 
using aggregate data to estimate the productivity of water.  
Lynne (1978) addresses some of the problems encountered by Ruttan in his analysis of 
water values in south Florida. Using county level data of farm output and costs for 13 counties 
between 1949 and 1969, Lynne regresses the total value of sales on operating expenses per acre, 
operating capital per acre, cattle per acre, and irrigated and non-irrigated acreage. The 
explanatory variables are measured per acre in order to reduce multicollinearity. The intent is to 
capture the effect of irrigation on total value product   while controlling for technology (rather 
than other factors of production per se.) When this simple model is estimated, the coefficient on 
irrigation is significant at the 5% level. However, since both total sales and irrigated acreage are 
correlated with the size of the county, Lynne adds dummy variables for each county and year. 
When county size is accounted for, irrigated acreage has no significant effect on total value 
product.  
Lynne offers several interesting explanations for why the marginal value product of 
irrigation is not significantly different from zero in his model. First, farmers may be following 
the advice of agricultural extension officers to apply water to maximize crop yield rather than 
profits. Thus water is applied until its marginal value product is zero. Such over-watering is 
consistent with risk averse behavior, as Willis and Wittlesley (1998) demonstrate. Second, 
farmers may be trying to capture economic rents from a common property resource. To the 
extent that there is non-excludability in water resources, there is an incentive for farmers to over-
use the resource. Third, the county dummy variables reduce the heterogeneity in crop type since 
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certain crops dominate production in some counties. By capturing county level differences, the 
dummy variables capture the effect that different crops may have on water values. Finally, if 
farmers across counties use similar production processes and similar technology to achieve 
similar profit levels, then the effect of water on total value product will be indeterminate. This 
point is similar to that made by Torell et al. (1990) that characteristics of the Ogallala aquifer that 
were not significant in previous studies became significant when regional data with more 
variation in those variables were used.  
Michael Moore has written three excellent articles on water demand: two with Gollehon 
and Carey in 1994 concerning the structure of the demand for water, and most recently in 1999 
concerning irrigators‟ ability to pay for reclamation water.  Moore et al. (1994a and 1994b) do 
not directly relate to this study in that the price of water is defined to be the cost of pumping 
groundwater, but these studies are very helpful in explaining how farmers decide to irrigate. 
Specifically, these articles test whether short-run water allocation on a multi-crop farm is better 
explained using a satisficing model, a variable input profit maximization model, or a fixed, 
allocatable input profit maximization model. They also analyze whether the demand for water 
more affected by long run decisions on crop allocations or short run decisions on application 
rates. 
Moore (1999) estimates irrigators‟ ability to pay for Bureau of Reclamation water in 
thirteen water districts in California. Moore develops a revenue function that maximizes revenue 
from six crops subject to a fixed endowment of water and a fixed, composite input (represented 
by irrigated cropland). The shadow price of water is the partial derivative of the revenue function 
with respect to water, i.e. marginal revenue functions. The optimal quantity of the composite 
input is computed by finding the level of irrigated land such that its shadow value equals the 
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market price for irrigated land. (This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.)  Total cost is found 
by summing the shadow price of water times the quantity of water and the market price of 
irrigated land times its optimal value. Profit equals the revenue function minus the cost function. 
The shadow value of water is then found as the residual: profit minus the estimated revenue 
function minus the cost of irrigated land.  
This residual computation for water value differs from farm budget analysis because it 
first models water as a fixed endowment that constrains revenue maximization. Simple farm 
budget analysis computes the residual value of water as total revenue minus costs other than 
water minus a normal profit. Using the constrained revenue maximizing approach, Moore finds 
that 12 of the 13 water districts had a positive ability to pay for water during the period based on 
shadow values of water ranging, for example, from $42 to $70 in 1989. This is in contrast to 8 of 
13 districts determined by the Reclamation Bureau to have a positive ability to pay based on 
farm budget analysis. These shadow prices further explain why water prices charged by the 
district have no statistically significant effect on farm behavior, since district water prices range 
from $5 to $15 per acre-foot -- far below the estimated value of the water. Finally, Moore finds 
that estimated water values are sensitive to the water endowment provided to farmers. The less 
water provided, the higher the shadow value. Moore cautions that the reliability of his result 
depends on the extent to which cropland is closely correlated to other inputs. 
A satisficing model postulates that allocation decisions are based on profit maximization 
in the long run, but not in the short run. Due to high information costs, short run allocation 
decisions are based on expert advice, or rules of thumb concerning a per acre application rate of 
inputs for each crop. Thus water use for a crop is a function of the crop‟s acreage and exogenous 
factors such as climate. This is consistent with Lynne‟s (1978) assertion that farmers follow 
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agricultural extension officers‟ advice to apply water at a fixed rate per crop in order to 
maximize yield. Just et al. (1990) support this position. They conclude that, based on 
specification tests, a satisficing model better explains water allocation on farms in Israel than 
does a variable input model.  
A variable input model tests whether farmers allocate inputs in accordance with profit-
maximization in the short run. In this model, water use for a crop is a function of the output 
price, the price of water, and input prices, as well as the crop‟s acreage and exogenous factors. 
The fixed, allocatable input model adds a constraint on the total amount of water available in a 
given year. The constraint on water use arises due to the fixed nature of wells, pump capacity, 
water-distribution equipment, and institutional constraints such as limited water rights or 
permits. In this model, farmers allocate inputs to maximize profits subject to the total amount of 
water available. The fixed water input creates interdependence across crops in the allocation of 
water. The amount of water applied to one crop now depends on the acreage of other crops as 
each one claims some of the fixed supply of water. Other factors affecting water demand in this 
model include output prices of other crops, input prices and the total quantity of water as well as 
own crop acreage and exogenous factors. 
For each model, Moore et al. (1994a) estimate equations of water use for five crops: 
alfalfa, barley, corn, dry beans and wheat. These equations are the derivatives with respect to the 
price of water of a normalized quadratic profit function for each crop. A simple nested F test can 
be used to compare the satisficing model to each of the other models. For the variable input 
model, if the coefficients on the output price, the price of water, and input prices are all equal to 
zero then the satisficing model is the preferred model. Similarly for the fixed, allocatable input 
model, if all the coefficients other than a crop‟s own acreage and exogenous factors are equal to 
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zero then the satisficing model is preferred. Moore et al. (1994a) find that the fixed, allocatable 
input model is preferred to the satisficing model and the satisficing model is preferred to the 
variable input model. In non- nested tests and prediction accuracy tests between the variable 
input model and fixed, allocatable input model the fixed, allocatable input model again is 
preferred to the variable input model.  
There are two other interesting results from the fixed, allocatable input model. First, the 
total water use variable is positive and significant for each crop (see table 2.5) In contrast, the 
water price variable is not significant in each of the equations in the variable input model. 
Moreover, the size of the coefficient on total water use is consistent with the intensity of water 
used by each crop. The coefficient on total water use in the water demand equation for corn is 
0.485 compared to 0.088 in the water demand equation for barley. As water becomes more 
available it is allocated more heavily to crops with higher water requirements (nearly half an 
acre-foot applied to corn versus less than one-tenth of an acre-foot to barley.)  
Second, in terms of the interdependence of water demand, 13 of 20 intercrop acreage 
variables are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. The quantity of water applied to one crop 
depends on the acreages planted in other crops.  For example, the coefficient on alfalfa acreage 
in the water demand equation for corn is –1.028. A one-acre increase in alfalfa would reduce the 
amount of water applied to corn by 1.028 acre-feet. Conversely, the coefficient on corn acreage 
in the alfalfa water demand equation is –0.466.  
There are two limitations to this study. One is the necessity of combining farm-level data 
on crops and prices with crop level data on water use. Using Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey 
data limits the analysis to the subset of farms that irrigate. In addition, this study uses total water  
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Table 2.5. Estimates of short-run water use, allocatable fixed input model
a
. 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Alfalfa 
 
Barley 
 
Corn 
 
Dry beans 
 
Wheat 
ALFPRC 58.466 
*
 11.462 -5.323 1.578 12.842 
BARPRC -690.89 
*
 -83.802 69.864 -52.962 -168.65 
CRNPRC 6804.2 
*
 745.33 67.346 107.29 312.58 
DBNPRC 318.38 
* *
 65.294 -49.879 8.353 28.125 
WHTPRC -8588.2 
*
 -1579.6 1002.8 -100.02 -677.31 
WAGE -195.72 
 
 155.60 -175.69 -101.06 9.169 
ALFACR 1.475 
* *
 -0.278 
* *
 -1.028 
* * 
 -0.316
* *
 -0.299
* *
 
BARACR -0.213 1.308 
* *
 -1.423 
* *
 -0.545
* *
 -0.265 
CRNACR -0.466 
* *
 -0.078 0.886
* *
 -0.196
* *
 -0.277
* *
 
DBNACR 0.021 -0.190 -0.600
* *
 0.799
* *
 -0.056 
WHTACR -0.430 
* *
 -0.282 
* *
 -0.727
* *
 -0.056 1.037
* *
 
TOTWTR 0.239 
* *
 0.088 
* *
 0.485
* *
 0.139
* *
 0.137
* *
 
DMSRWT -6.964 66.332 -126.49
* *
 13.954 -94.611 
DMOWNTC -28.729 -44.167 -60.504 15.163 18.731 
DMNOWT 26.245 10.043 -12.072 -27.321 90.272 
DMHGMG -44.628 4.290 -29.580 -4.222 -49.736 
DMLWMG 40.268 -6.311 1.915 -22.593 52.050 
OWNCDD 0.095 
*
 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.009 
OWNPCP 9.858 -0.824 -3.725 4.995 -8.641 
SAND -54.711 -296.86 49.225 78.484 -228.95
* *
 
INTERCEPT 2181.0 
*
 730.42 -1457.7 326.28 126.85 
Adjusted R
2
 0.903 0.749 0.959 0.900 0.839 
* 
and 
* * 
denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a
 Dependent variable is crop-level water use.   
Moore, Gollehon, and Carey (1994a) 
 
use on the farm as the fixed amount of water available. To a certain extent this assumes what is 
being tested: that all farms operate on the water constraint. A more accurate measure of the water 
constraint would be to construct a measure of the water available in aquifers, as do Torell et al. 
(1990) in their analysis of farms using the Ogallala aquifer. 
One implication of Moore et al. (1994a) is that water demand decisions are made 
primarily at the time a farmer decides his crop mix. In their following article, Moore et al. 
(1994b) seek to test this explicitly. This article looks at how farmers‟ production decisions 
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change with water prices, the extent to which water use decisions take place on the extensive 
margin (according to crop allocations) or on the intensive margin (short-run water application 
decisions), and whether these decisions vary across regions. As in the previous article, the 
authors assume input non-jointness in production to allow profit maximization by crop.  
Water price is again treated as the cost of pumping groundwater. In this article, land is a 
fixed, allocatable input while water is a variable input. Total water use on the farm is the sum of 
water used on each crop, i as follows: 
 
]);;,,,(*,,,[ xxNbrpnbrpwW
i
ii
    (2.1) 
 
Water use on a crop depends on that crop‟s output price, pi, a vector of input prices, r, the price 
of water, b, and the optimal amount of land allocated to that crop, ni*. Because land is a fixed, 
allocatable input, the optimal land allocation depends on all output and input prices, p and r, the 
price of water, b, the land constraint, N, and a vector of exogenous factors, x.  
Taking the total derivative of the water function with respect to the price of water shows 
that changes in farm-level water use depend directly on the change in water applied to each crop 
(the intensive margin) and indirectly through the change in water as the optimal land allocated to 
a crop changes with the price of water (the extensive margin.)  
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Equation 2.2 shows that total water use on a farm may increase or decrease with an increase in 
the price of water. While the direct effect of a price increase would be to reduce the amount of 
water applied to a crop, the indirect effect of a price increase on the optimal allocation of land to 
a crop could be positive or negative. If more land is allocated to a crop that uses water 
intensively then farm-level water use may actually increase with an increase in price.  
The authors suggest that when summing across crops farm-level water demand should 
decrease in water price. That is, farmers will adopt a land allocation and water application rate 
that overall uses less water. This is a logical assertion that is generally supported by the linear 
programming models. There is, however, some evidence that suggests this is not always true.  
Gardner (1983) finds that water districts (in Kern County, California in 1975) with higher 
water prices tend to have a larger proportion of land allocated to high-value crops that use water 
intensively such as vegetables and orchards. Low value grains are more concentrated in regions 
with low water costs – even after correcting for soil quality and other geographic factors. 
Gardner‟s explanation relies on the role of input substitution rather than the output substitution, 
which is the focus of Moore et al (1994b). Gardner argues that as water becomes expensive 
relative to other inputs, farmers will substitute into other inputs and use labor, land and capital 
more intensively. In addition, high value crops tend to have higher variability in output and price, 
which increases the relative value of water as a risk-reducing factor of production. The extent to 
which water is a substitute for these other inputs is not directly addressed by Gardner. 
 Moore et al. (1994b) use a probit model to estimate farmers‟ discrete choice to grow a 
particular crop. They then use Tobit models to estimate the optimal land allocation and 
individual crop supply functions. Finally they use a Heckman model to estimate water demand 
for each crop.  These functions are estimated for five crops in each of four regions of the west. In 
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the Northwest region (Idaho, Oregon, and Washington) and the Central Plains region (Colorado, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming) the five crops are Alfalfa, corn for grain, wheat, barley, and 
dry beans. In the Southern Plains region (eastern New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and the 
Southwest region (western New Mexico, Arizona, and California) the five crops are alfalfa, corn 
for grain, wheat, cotton, and grain sorghum. Only farms that grow at least two of these crops are 
included in the sample. Farms that grow vegetables or orchards are not included in the sample.  
A key finding of this study is that the price of water is a significant factor in fourteen of 
the twenty crop allocation equations, that is, at the extensive margin. It is not statistically 
significant in any estimate of short-run water demand at the intensive margin. Clearly the impact 
of water price on profit-maximizing decisions occurs as farmers decide crop allocations rather 
than on short-run water application rates. This result is consistent with a satisficing or behavioral 
model where acreage in a crop determines short-run water use, or alternatively, a model treating 
water as a fixed, allocatable factor.  
The extensive margin decision also dominates the intensive margin decision in its 
absolute effect on total water demand per crop. In every case the change in water use in total 
water demand is the same as the change on the extensive margin. For example, an increase in the 
price of water increases the acreage devoted to wheat in the Northwest so that 6.16 more acre-
feet of water are applied to wheat. The direct effect of the increase in price is to reduce the 
amount of water applied to wheat in the short run by 1.92 acre-feet of water. Overall, the 
increase in price increases the total water applied to wheat by 4.24 acre-feet of water.   
These effects vary for each crop in each region. Allocations of alfalfa and wheat acreage 
respond to an increase in water price in a manner consistent with intuition. All else equal, as 
water price increases, acreage in water-intensive crops should be supplanted by crops using less 
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water. The acreage allocated to alfalfa, which has the heaviest water-use requirement, decreases 
in every region as the price of water increases.  That is, water use in alfalfa declines on the 
extensive margin. The acreage allocated to wheat, which has a relatively low water-use 
requirement, increases in every region with the price of water. Corn, however, does not respond 
in an easily explained manner. In the Central plains region (eastern New Mexico, Oklahoma), 
water use in corn strongly increases on both the external and internal margins as water price 
increases, but it declines on both margins in the Southwest region (western New Mexico, 
Arizona). Similar observations can be made about the other crops. 
The authors attribute the different responses to water prices across regions to structural 
differences in supply functions for each crop in each region. Chow tests strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural differences between the Northwest and Central Plains regions and 
between the Southwest and Southern Plains regions. While finding regional differences in 
production technology is not new, the authors‟ analysis of this result is somewhat less 
convincing. Why would water use in corn increase with water price in eastern New Mexico, but 
decrease in western New Mexico? What technological differences might explain this? It seems 
possible that this result arises due to limitations in the data.  
The sample is limited to farmers growing at least two of five grain crops. Farmers who 
grow vegetables are excluded from the sample. In addition, there is very little regional variation 
in the other two input prices (state-level wages, and regional-level bulk gasoline purchases) used 
in the study. Homogeneous farmers making input decisions based on similar input prices across 
regions seems unlikely to capture the substitutability of water for other inputs as postulated by 
Gardner (1983). Regional variation in this case seems to be driven by treating land as a fixed, 
allocatable input, so that changes in the price of water result in changes in land allocations 
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(which must sum to zero) rather than substitution among inputs. The ability of this model to 
explain regional differences might be enhanced by including high value crops and input prices 
with more regional variation.  
 
 2.3.5  Regional Models  
There have been few attempts to estimate water values across regions. Those that do, 
usually (and logically) define the region to be a particular water basin. This allows these models 
to incorporate the supply of water. Two good examples of this are Beare et al. (1998), and 
Booker and Young (1994). Beare et al. incorporate a hydrological model into a profit 
maximization model for the Murray Darling River Basin in Australia. The authors run a 
computer simulation model that allows them to compare the effects of two rivers, one with an 
uncertain flow that frequently constrains farmers‟ production and another which has a constant 
flow. The results show that seasonal uncertainty in supply has a very large effect on the value of 
water to farmers. The opportunity cost of water to farmers operating with an uncertain supply of 
water is two to four times higher than the cost of water to farmers with a deterministic supply. 
They conclude that calculating the value of water on the basis of gross margins may substantially 
understate the value of water and associated infrastructure (Beare et al. 1998, 933).  
Booker and Young (1994) use a nonlinear mathematical programming model to estimate 
the net benefits from using markets to allocate the water in the Colorado River Basin more 
efficiently. They measure the gain in net benefits from changes in irrigation, the production of 
hydroelectric power, and municipal water use when water is allowed to be traded within the state 
and across state lines. In the best-case scenario, the value of reallocated water is $185 per acre-
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foot. Interestingly, they show that markets will fail to increase the value of water to this 
maximum unless the negative external effects of water salinity are taken into account. 
Three models discussed in previous sections also have implications concerning the 
regional value of water: Schaible (1997), Torell, et al. (1990), and Moore et al. (1994b).  Each of 
these studies shows that regional factors affect the value of water. Torell et al. finds that farm 
income and the characteristics of the Ogallala aquifer underlying a farm have significant effects 
on the value of water in the Midwest. Both Schaible (1997) and Moore et al. (1994b) find that, 
when responding to a change in water price, crop allocations of field crops differ considerably by 
region. Schaible identifies three regional factors that affect these decisions: the availability of 
surface versus groundwater, the production of field crops versus higher-valued crops, and water 
management institutions. Underlying these factors are issues of substitutability in joint profit 
functions: the degree to which groundwater can substitute for surface water, water in field crops 
can substitute for water in vegetables, and institutional factors that restrict substitutability. Moore 
et al. (1994b) simply attributes the differences to structural differences in production. Both 
studies conclude that regional factors must be considered in designing water policy. Neither 
study considers why these differences exist or why they may persist. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
 
Every method for estimating the value of water has certain strengths and drawbacks. 
Hedonic models are not appropriate over large regions since they assume a single market. 
Programming models depend on assumptions that limit farmers‟ choices. More recent models 
estimate crop supply and water demand functions based on maximizing restricted profit 
functions. Rather than estimate the profit function directly, however, these studies directly 
estimate reduced-form demand and supply functions based on particular prices (especially the 
cost of pumping water).  
This study takes a slightly different approach. It seeks to determine the value of water in 
agriculture by directly estimating farmers‟ optimizing decisions through a profit function. It 
builds on work by Ruttan (1965), Schaible (1997), and Moore et. al (1994a, 1994b, and 1999), 
by expanding the regional scope to include all twenty of the largest irrigating states. Aggregating 
data into three output price indices expands the analysis to include the effects of producing 
orchard and vegetable crops as well as field crops. Combining the increased scope (both 
geographically and in outputs) with the development of individual price indices for each crop 
reporting district increases the amount of variation available in the independent variables to 
explain differences in profitability and water values. Input price indices for labor, fuel and 
chemicals allow tests of the substitutability of water with other inputs as suggested by Gardner 
(1983).  Including specific measures to capture differences in soil, climate, water supply, and 
irrigation technology across regions allows this study to test directly those factors hypothesized 
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by Schaible to affect water values. Finally, the dual nature of the profit function is utilized to 
analyze the effects of agricultural policies on water values across regions.  
 
3.1  Theoretical Model 
First introduced by Hotelling in the 1930‟s, the profit function, like the cost function, 
assumes optimizing behavior.  The starting place for the development of the dual profit function 
is the traditional firm-level profit maximizing formulation. 
 
.0),(       s.t .
''   Max
,
xqF
xwqp
xq             (3.1) 
 
where p is a vector of M output prices, q is a vector of M output quantities, w is a vector of N 
input prices, x is a vector of N input quantities, and F(.) is a production technology that converts 
combinations of inputs into combinations of outputs. When q and x are elements of a production 
possibilities set that is a closed, bounded, smooth, and strictly convex set of all feasible 
combinations of inputs and outputs, then the profit function will be strictly nonnegative, 
nondecreasing in p, nonincreasing in w, linearly homogeneous, and convex and continuous in 
(p,w). The primary advantage to using a profit function rather than a cost function is that demand 
functions derived from a profit function depend on output prices (as well as input prices), which 
are relevant to long-run irrigation decisions when cropping patterns and irrigated area respond to 
changes in consumer demand. Moreover, these outputs are treated as endogenous in the model. 
Examples of this specification are found in Quiroga and Bravo-Ureta (1992), and Squires (1987). 
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Applying Hotelling‟s Lemma, the derivative of the profit function with respect to the 
price of a particular output yields the firm-level supply function for that output. The derivative of 
the profit function with respect to an input price yields the factor demand function for that input: 
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This specification assumes that all inputs are variable, and that they adjust immediately and 
costlessly to their long-run equilibrium values. Subscript i references the M outputs, and 
subscript j references the N inputs.  
Modifying this specification slightly, it is assumed here that the vector of inputs x is 
composed of two types of inputs.  The first type is x, the traditional variable input, while the 
second type, z, includes quasi-fixed inputs that cannot be instantaneously varied.  Thus, at any 
particular point in time, quasi-fixed inputs may not be at their long-run equilibrium levels, and 
variable inputs are optimized accordingly.  The use of water is not completely flexible.  While 
the amount of water applied to any crop under irrigation can be varied (within permitted 
amounts), extension of irrigation to additional acreage requires the investment in additional 
capital items such as irrigation wells and center pivot systems.  Other factors that take time to 
change include legal rights or permits to water, and the overall supply of water. The value of 
machinery also is assumed to be a quasi-fixed factor. 
The firm-level optimization problem now becomes 
 
 40 
 
 
.                      
0),,(st                          
''   Max
,
),,(
0
0
zz
zxqF
xwqp
vq
zwpR
    (3.3) 
 
This optimization problem yields a restricted profit function ),,( 0zwpR when optimizing 
behavior is a function of the level of a fixed input. The derivatives of the profit function with 
respect to the quasi-fixed inputs yield the shadow price or implicit value of the fixed resource in 
the production process  
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where each shadow price p,w z
0
 is a function of input and output prices and the levels of the 
quasi-fixed variables.   
To see how the restricted solution can provide information about the efficient allocation 
of water, consider profit maximization to be a two-stage process.  In the first stage, the levels of 
outputs and inputs are chosen to maximize profit given the level of the quasi-fixed factors 
),,( 0zwpR  as in (3.3).  In the second stage, the levels of quasi-fixed factors are chosen to 
maximize total profit. With perfectly competitive markets, firms will use the long-run profit-
maximizing level of all inputs when the shadow price of the quasi-fixed  
factors equals the observed rental values of those inputs. 
 
 
kk rzwp ),,(
0            (3.5) 
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where rk is, for example, the rental price of equipment (k=1), or the market price of water (k=2).  
When 
kk rzwp ),,(
0 , which is possible due to constraints on the quasi-fixed factor, 
equation (3.5) can be solved for the value of the quasi-fixed factor, z*, such that equation (3.5) 
holds. Substituting this calculated z* from (3.5) into the restricted profit function in (3.3) gives 
the total profit function,   
 
rwprzrwpzwprwp R ,,*,,*;,,,                             (3.6) 
 
Note that the long-run profit function defined in (3.6) is never achieved in the short run 
(Kulatilaka, 1985).  It is simply a technique for distinguishing between short run and long run 
levels of inputs that maximize profit.  The difference between the observed levels of z and the 
optimal levels, z*, indicate the level of short-run disequilibria in the quasi-fixed inputs (Quiroga 
and Bravo-Ureta, 1992).  Disequilibria can be measured in either quantity-space, or in price-
space.  Direct tests of equation (3.5) have been used to measure asset fixity and whether firms 
are in long-run equilibrium (see, for example, Taylor, 1994, Schankerman and Nadiri, 1986, 
Kulatilaka, 1985, and Chambers and Vasavada, 1983).   
Estimated shadow prices from equation (3.5) can be tested against market prices for 
water in areas where those markets exist using a generalization of a t-test (Kulatilaka, 1985).  In 
a related approach, shadow prices can be compared to the cost of pumping water from the 
aquifer. Many studies treat the pumping cost of water as the price of water in estimating the 
demand for water. If the shadow value of water is significantly higher than the pumping costs, or 
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the market value of water in imperfect markets, then these studies can overestimate the demand 
for water and underestimate the sensitivity of water to changes in its price.  
Each estimated shadow price of water in region g, kg, can be used to test if water is 
being used efficiently in regions with markets for water. Assuming that the market price of water 
(rkg) is constant and identical across farmers in a region, the hypothesis is that the implicit value 
of water equals the market value: 
 
 kg(p,w,z
0
) = rkg  g  Regions with water markets (3.7) 
 
The t-test from Kulatilaka (1985) is 
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where rkg is the market price of water in region g,  is the coefficient vector of the estimated 
profit function, )( kgV is the variance of the shadow price of water, and )(V is the variance 
covariance matrix of the regression. If the shadow price, kg  is greater (less) than the market 
price, rkg, then farmers are using less (more) than the optimal amount of water.
6
 The sub-optimal 
allocation of water may be due to market failures such as rigidities in water contracts that prevent 
markets from allocating water efficiently. Alternatively, inefficiencies may arise due to the 
quasi-fixed nature of water, which reduces farmers‟ ability to allocate water efficiently in a given 
                                                 
6
 Given the scarcity of water market transactions, it may be difficult to find a water price, r. It could be a spot price 
at a particular moment in time, or it could be the average price over many market transactions. In either case, it 
could be hard to argue that r is an equilibrium price. 
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year due to institutional factors such as water rights, or fixed supplies combined with low supply 
prices. 
A similar test can be conducted substituting rpc for rkg, where rpc is the pumping cost of 
water in regions where water demand analyses have been conducted using pumping cost as an 
instrument for water price. If the shadow price of water varies significantly from the pumping 
cost, then these estimates of water demand may be inaccurate. The shadow price of water would 
exceed pumping costs if the marginal cost of water includes costs in addition to pumping costs, 
or if the supply of water is constrained by water shortages or by institutional factors. The shadow 
price could be lower than the cost of pumping water if surface water resources are available for 
irrigation at very low cost, or if irrigation water is used to reduce uncertainty.  
Recall that Moore et al. (1994b) postulate that changes in crop allocation explain how the 
demand for water changes in response to changes in its price. They find that changes in crop 
allocation are consistent with intuition in some cases (i.e. an increase in water price causes less 
acreage to be allocated to crop i when crop i is water intensive) but not in others. This study 
essentially reverses the question by considering how water values change in response to changes 
in crop prices. Specifically, what is the sign and magnitude of the total derivative d
2 R
dzdpi = 
d /dpi? Intuitively, we expect this term to be positive for a crop that uses water intensively. The 
partial derivative / pi =  
2 R
z pi = Qi/ z, by Young‟s theorem. Thus the change in the 
value of water when the price of crop i changes, all else equal, is the same as the change in the 
supply of  crop i when the water constraint eases, which is positive (as long as the quasi-fixed 
nature of water does not prevent second-order effects from being arbitrarily small). Notice that 
the Young‟s theorem result depends on holding other factors constant. Additional intuition may 
come from the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trading model. In an HO world, the Stolper-Samuelson 
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theory predicts that water values would increase with an increase in the price of a water-intensive 
crop. On the other hand, if there are factors that differentiate water as an input across sectors, 
then the specific factors model suggests that the direction of a price change on the relative value 
of water will vary by sector.  
The overall effect of agricultural policies on the shadow price of water can be determined 
by summing the elasticity dln( /dln(pi)over all i‟s. This term tells us the total sensitivity of 
water values to changes in all those commodity prices affected by a policy change. The regional 
effects of agricultural policies can be determined using simple simulations. By comparing 
k(p,w,z
0
) with the shadow price of water calculated at prices stripped of the effects of 
agricultural policies ( ag), ( where ag = k(p
no
,w,z
0
)), the effects of those policies on regional 
water values can be determined.
7
 Because prices in this study are indices weighted by regional 
crop allocations, this technique is well-suited to capture any region-specific effects on water 
values. It should be noted, however, that this procedure captures short-run effects: profits are not 
re-estimated at unsubsidized prices, and while optimal crop allocations will change with output 
prices, input prices and elasticities of substitution remain unchanged. This procedure therefore 
captures the effect of an immediate change in output prices and likely overestimates the effect on 
the shadow price of water as output supplies and input demands adjust over time in response to 
the new prices. 
A more detailed analysis of regional variations in water values requires calculating the 
shadow price of water for each region. That is, shadow prices are shifted by regional factors in 
addition to input and output prices. Regional characteristics that affect water values are modeled 
in the profit function inside the coefficient on water. This specification allows these factors to 
                                                 
7
 The price index P
no
 is the price index calculated without government subsidies as described in the data section. 
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shift the overall water demand function. There are three types of regional characteristics: 
irrigation technology, property rights, and geological or geographic factors. 
Variables that measure the share of irrigation from flood irrigation, spray irrigation, and 
micro-drip techniques are designed to capture structural differences in production, based on 
farmers‟ choices of irrigation technology. The two extremes are flood irrigation and micro-drip. 
Flood irrigation is the lowest cost irrigation technique, but it consumes a relatively high volume 
of water. Micro-drip techniques use relatively little water, but have the highest investment costs. 
Flood irrigation should be correlated with lower water values, and micro-drip with higher water 
values.  
Property rights vary by state, and include: state water permits, where farmers have no 
water rights; riparian rights, where water use is tied to land ownership; appropriative rights, 
where water is not necessarily tied to land; and appropriative rights with water markets where 
water can be sold. All else equal, water values in regions with water permits should be the 
lowest, since the water has no asset value, and uncertainty about future access to water may 
reduce investment in irrigation technology. Regions with appropriative rights should have higher 
shadow prices relative to riparian rights since appropriative rights place fewer restrictions on 
water use. Regions with water markets should have the highest shadow prices since markets 
allow farmers to reallocate water to its highest-value use, and to capitalize on cities‟ high 
demand for water. In addition, water markets are likely to arise in regions where the benefits of 
reallocating water exceed the transaction costs by the widest margin.   
The irrigation technology and property rights variables are important because they 
indicate whether water is being misallocated due to institutional factors or behavioral choices. 
For example, if regions with appropriative water rights have higher shadow prices than regions 
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with riparian rights, the implication is that a state with riparian water laws can increase the value 
of its resources by adopting appropriative water rights. Similarly, if shadow prices vary by 
irrigation technique then it may be possible to change farmers‟ behavior (by providing 
information or incentives) to increase the net value of water resources on farms.  
The final set of variables is geographically fixed variables that may affect crop selection 
and the marginal value product of water. These variables include climate, precipitation, and 
characteristics of the soil and the aquifer. As Faux and Perry showed in their hedonic analysis, 
soil quality is positively correlated with water values.  The productivity of water increases when 
applied to higher quality soil. High-value and water-intensive crops (e.g. vegetables) tend to be 
grown in warmer and drier climates, which therefore should be correlated with higher water 
values. Water supply characteristics such as the share of irrigation from groundwater, and depth 
to the aquifer increase the cost of irrigation, and may influence the irrigation technique. To the 
extent that these two variables are correlated with higher marginal costs of water, they should 
have a positive effect on the shadow price of water. 
The geographically fixed variables demonstrate that there are other fixed, non-market 
factors that affect the optimal allocation of water. It is interesting to learn the relative impact that 
each of these factors has on water values since one criticism of previous hedonic studies (with 
the exception of soil quality in Faux and Perry) is that they fail to isolate these effects. For 
example, if warm climates significantly increase the shadow price of water, then it is logical for 
farmers to compete with cities for scarce and valuable water in warm climates. Florida, in 
particular, with its warm climate attracting new residents to its prime vegetable growing regions, 
and with no private ownership of water, would be destined to have political water wars.  
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3.2  Econometric Model 
This analysis estimates the profit function using two very different flexible functional 
forms (FFF): the translog and the minflex Laurent Generalized Leontieff (MLGL). The FFF 
specification fits a very general production technology that allows elasticities of substitution and 
returns to scale to vary across factors and over time. Specifically, Diewert flexible functions 
(second-order numerical approximations) can approximate the level of profit, the derived 
demands and supplies, and the effect of price changes on those demand and supply functions. 
Compared to estimation of profit functions based on specific production functions (such as the 
Cobb-Douglas or the Leontief), the FFF specification reduces the likelihood of specification 
error, and it reduces the restrictions imposed by the specific production function such as the 
substitutability of inputs in the Cobb-Douglas (Gallant, 1984, Pope, 1984).  
Estimation using flexible functional forms is not without its difficulties. When estimating 
these functions as approximations to a true function using separable technology, these functions 
lose second-order flexibility. That is, they require specific functional forms for their aggregator 
functions (see Blackorby et al. 1977, and Thompson 1988). Many of these problems arise 
because the functions approximate around a single point. The translog, for example, is an 
approximation around the geometric mean. The flexible form therefore may be a poor 
approximation of the function except in the neighborhood of that point.  Indeed, the 
approximation point may be outside the range of data.  Moreover, global properties of the profit 
function, such as monotonicity and convexity, may not hold for the FFF.  Thus specification 
error is still possible under the FFF specification (Chalfant, 1984). 
The general (lower case) price and quantity variables in the equations above are defined 
specifically as follows: 
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 = Restricted profit per acre 
QV = Quantity of vegetables  
QR = Quantity index of field crops 
QF = Quantity index of fuel  
QL = Quantity index of labor 
QC = Quantity index of chemicals  
PV = Price index of vegetables 
PR = Price index of field (row) crops 
PF = Price index of fuel 
PO = Price index of other inputs 
PL = Price index of labor 
PC = Price index of chemicals 
ZW = W = Water in acre-feet per acre 
ZM = Value of machinery 
ZO = Quantity index for orchards 
X1 = Mean water holding capacity of soil 
X2 = Organic matter in soil 
X3 = Groundslope 
X4 = Soil drainage 
X5 = Cat-ion exchange in soil 
X6 = Share of water applied through gravity irrigation 
X7 = Share of water from groundwater sources 
X8 = Mean precipitation 
X9 = Mean temperature. 
 
 
The Pi’s are Fisher price indices, and the Qi’s are implicit Fisher quantity indices. In the translog 
function, prices are normalized by the price index of chemicals. This is denoted by PiC. So, PVC = 
PV/PC,  PRC = PR/PC,  C
R
 = 
R
/ PC. 
 
 3.2.1  Translog Profit Function 
In trying to select a particular FFF, there is no clear-cut winner. Many studies find that a 
one FFF performs better than others for that particular model and data set (e.g. Fisher et al. 2001, 
Giannakas et al. 2003). Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) expand on an earlier work by Caves and 
Christensen (1980), to determine the size of the regions where regularity conditions 
(monotonicity and quasi-convexity of an indirect utility function) hold for translog, generalized 
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Leontieff, and minflex Laurent indirect utility functions with two and three goods.  They show 
that the translog specification, which is a Taylor series expansion, has large regions in which the 
regularity conditions are satisfied when the parameter values of the underlying function approach 
the Cobb-Douglas specification.  The size of the regular regions diminishes rapidly, however, as 
the values for the elasticities of substitution diverge from Cobb-Douglas.   
In theory and in practice, the translog has many attractive characteristics. It is linear in 
parameters, which makes it straightforward to estimate. Thompson and Langworthy (1989) use 
Monte Carlo techniques to show that the translog model generates the lowest mean absolute 
deviations between underlying true and estimated price and cross-price elasticities compared to 
the quadratic, generalized Leontief, and minflex Laurent models. Moreover, the translog is a 
nonlinear transformation of the dependent variable. Lopez (1985) has shown that second-order 
flexible functions that are linear functions of profit impose restrictions of homotheticity and 
additive separability such that expansion paths are quasi-homothetic and the marginal rate of 
input substitution is independent of output. The translog avoids this limitation.  
The translog profit function is: 
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where the dependant variables are profit per acre, the profit share of outputs, and negative shares 
of inputs. The P‟s are output prices and input prices normalized over the price of chemicals. The 
Z‟s are quasi-fixed variables (ZW denotes the quasi-fixed amount of water.) The ‟s, ‟s, and ‟s, 
are parameters. In equation 3.9, the i and j subscripts count over input and output prices, the k‟s 
and m‟s count quasi-fixed factors, and the n‟s count water-affecting variables such as climate. 
The X‟s are variables that specifically affect water use, such as climate or share of gravity 
irrigation. The Si are the profit shares of outputs and the negative profit shares of inputs. Input 
shares must be negative to be consistent with a profit function in netput space. The benefit of 
including share equations is that they provide additional information and impose constraints on 
the coefficients to reflect input demand and output supply. Symmetry and homogeneity are 
imposed, while separability among input and output categories is a maintained assumption. 
Convexity of the profit function requires that the Hessian (
2
/ Pi Pj ) be positive semi-definite, 
and the Hessian (
2
/ Zi Zk) be negative semi-definite. 
Once the profit function has been estimated, regional shadow prices of water can be 
calculated by applying equation (3.4) to the regression results in equation (3.9): 
 
Wi
icWi
m
mWmW
WWW
k
Z
PZ
ZZZ
4
0 )ln()ln(     
ln
ln
          (3.10) 
 
 51 
 
 
where k is the estimated shadow price of water in region k, calculated at mean values of the 
independent variables in region k.  The own and cross-price elasticities for input demand and 
output supply are: 
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where Qi are netputs (positive output quantities or negative input quantities) from the profit 
function. 
 
3.2.2  Minflex Laurent Generalized Leontief Profit Function 
The most attractive attribute of the MLGL is its large regularity regions. Barnett and Lee 
(1985) plot the regions that are consistent with monotonicity and quasi-convexity for several 
cases of predetermined elasticities. They find that the MLGL has much larger regularity regions, 
that these regions contain most if not all of the points from the other models regularity regions, 
and that these regions maintain their shape and location better than do those of the other two 
models. In addition, they find that the size of the regularity region of the MLGL indirect utility 
function increases with income.
8
 This makes it less likely that it will be necessary to impose 
                                                 
8
 The MLGL specification is based on a Laurent expansion. According to Barnett (1983) the theoretical advantage 
of a Laurent series expansion is that the remainder term varies more gradually than in a Taylor series.  To see the 
difference in their global properties let G1 be the set of x
m
 and G2 be the set of 1/x
m
  where m=0,1,…. A Taylor series 
uses only G1 as the basis to span a function. If x is less than 1 (in absolute value) then x decreases as m increases. 
Thus using G1 increases the accuracy of the approximation as m increases. The Laurent series uses both G1 and G2 to 
span the function space. If the absolute value of x is greater than 1 then G2 increases the refinement of the 
approximation as m increases. As a result the Laurent series has reasonable approximation over a larger region. 
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convexity on the estimated function. Imposing convexity is arduous, even on a well-behaved 
function such as the translog. Moreover, since this study seeks to estimate specific shadow 
values, these values could be sensitive to the technique used to impose convexity. On the other 
hand, the MLGL is a complicated, nonlinear system of equations that offer difficulties in 
estimation.  
The minflex-Laurent, generalized-Leontief profit function is written as: 
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(3.12) 
 
The variables are as defined above, except that prices are not normalized. The Qi‟s are netputs, 
positive output supply equations and negative input demand equations. The , , and  are 
parameters. Note that the effects of the Xn‟s on profit depend on water usage. Equations 
estimating the demand for other inputs and supply for orchards are not estimated since these are 
treated as quasi-fixed variables. Symmetry is imposed as in the translog. Convexity of the profit 
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function requires that the Hessian 
2
/ Pi Pj be positive semi-definite, and the Hessian  
2
/ Zi Zk be negative semi-definite. Since  
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then the MLGL is homogeneous of degree one, by Euler‟s theorem. Once the profit function has 
been estimated, regional shadow prices can be calculated by applying equation (3.4) to the 
regression results in equation (3.12): 
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(3.14) 
where k is the estimated shadow price k, calculated at mean values of the independent 
variables.The coefficients WW and W are for acre feet of water and the square-root of water, 
respectively. Regional water values, kg, are calculated from equation (3.14) using mean values 
of the independent variables for each region g. 
The own and cross-price elasticities for output supply and input demand for the MLGL 
function are given below. 
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where Qi represent netput quantities (negative input quantities or positive output quantities) from 
the profit function. 
 
3.3  Estimation of the Model 
The system of equations (equation (3.9) for the translog, and (3.12) for the MLGL,) is 
estimated using iterated seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). SUR estimators increase the 
efficiency of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators in a system of equations by taking 
advantage of any contemporaneous correlation across the error terms of the equations. If the 
error terms are uncorrelated, or the explanatory variables are the identical for all equations, then 
SUR estimates are identical to OLS estimates.  Since economic theory indicates that cross-
equation linkages exist (e.g. symmetry), SUR should provide more efficient estimators of the 
profit system. In fact, as table 3.1 shows, estimating the system in equation 3.12 using OLS 
shows considerable correlation among the residuals for input demands.  
In estimating the system of equations in (3.12) using SUR, the y matrix in equation (3.14) 
is a column matrix of 2,964 rows. The rows consist of 497 observations on stacked on top of 
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Table 3.1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients Among Residuals of Profit, 
Output Supply and Input Demand Equations, N = 497, with P-values. 
 QV QR QF QL QC 
       
1.000 -0.012 0.198 -0.042 -0.023 -0.025 
P-value  0.793 <.0001 0.345 0.614 0.578 
       
QVeg -0.012 1.000 -0.007 -0.230 -0.353 -0.342 
P-value 0.793  0.871 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
       
QRow 0.198 -0.007 1.000 -0.590 -0.177 -0.297 
P-value <.0001 0.871  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
       
QFuel -0.042 -0.230 -0.590 1.000 0.736 0.761 
P-value 0.345 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
       
QLabor -0.023 -0.353 -0.177 0.736 1.000 0.820 
P-value 0.614 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
       
QChem -0.025 -0.342 -0.297 0.761 0.820 1.000 
P-value 0.578 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
 
 
497 observations of the quantity index for vegetables, QV, and so on for QR, QF, QL, and QC.  The 
X matrix consists of all observations of the P, Z, and X variables from equation (3.12), also 
stacked on top of each other for each equation. If a particular variable is not in an equation it is 
replaced with zeros. The X matrix is of the dimension 2,964 by (k1+..+kn), where ki is the number 
of parameters in each equation.  
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The system can now be written as 
 
y = X SUR + 
in this case y is a vector of the dependent variable profit per acre. Equation (3.16) is estimated 
using feasible GLS. SUR uses feasible generalized least squares to estimate parameters, using 
the OLS covariance matrices of each equation, stacked one on top of the other, as an initial 
estimate of the unknown covariance matrix. Iterated SUR updates the estimated covariance 
matrix using residuals calculated using the FGLS coefficients. This process continues until 
changes in the covariance matrix and estimated coefficients are arbitrarily small. When the 
random errors follow a multivariate normal distribution, this estimator is asymptotically 
equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator. With this specification, the parameter vector 
sur  from the stacked system of equations in SUR equals 
 
yIXXIXSUR )(')('
111
   (3.17) 
 
where  originally is the covariance matrix obtained from estimating each equation using OLS 
and then stacking them. After the first regression, iterated SUR calculates a new based on sur  
and repeats the process until both and sur  converge.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DATA 
 
Previous estimation of similar models has shown that it is important to have ample 
degrees of freedom with this type of data in order for maximum likelihood estimators to 
converge. A related point is that this model performs better with data aggregated to a degree 
below state level. State level data offers too few degrees of freedom and too little variation. 
County level data, on the other hand, magnifies complications of suburban and urban land. In 
addition, soil quality data are not sufficiently detailed for county level data. Therefore the unit of 
observation in this study is the crop reporting district (CRD)
9
. Crop reporting districts are 
composed of adjoining counties with similar cropping patterns within each state. There are a 
total of 136 CRD‟s in the top twenty irrigating states which accounts for 93 percent of total water 
use in the country in 1997 (Census of Agriculture, 1997). Using data from four Census years 
(1982, 1987, 1992, 1997) provides 544 observations. Because CRDs in the western United States 
tend to be considerably larger than in the rest of the country, all non-price variables are 
expressed in per-acre terms to eliminate a source of heteroscedasticity. Using CRD‟s allows 
discussion of the results in terms of state level effects, or for broader regions. 
 A regional variable is constructed that divides CRD‟s into two regions. It is based on the 
ERS/USDA farm resource regions. In constructing farm resource regions the ERS uses cluster 
analysis and previous regional divisions to group regions based on similarities of soil, crop mix, 
climate, and production techniques. Region 1 consists of the Fruitful Rim Region and the Basin 
and Range Region. That is, it includes Florida, the coastal regions of Texas, and all the CRD‟s 
                                                 
9
 The USDA recently renamed crop reporting areas as agricultural statistical districts. 
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west of the Rocky Mountains. Region 1 contains areas with high value agriculture. Most of the 
vegetables, fruits and nuts grown in the U.S. are grown in this region. Water use in this region is 
much higher than in Region 2, averaging 1.5 acre-feet per harvested acre compared to 0.26 acre-
feet per harvested acre. Water is used much more intensively in Region 1 not only because more 
water is applied per irrigated acre, but also because a larger share of harvested acreage is 
irrigated.  
 
4.1  Water Data 
A major obstacle in constructing this data set has been water use data. Water use data is 
derived from the Farm and Ranch Irrigation Surveys (FRIS) of 1984, 1988, 1994 and 1998, 
aggregated to the level of CRDs after eliminating ranchers and specialty horticulturists from the 
data. Water use for each crop is determined by dividing the total amount of water applied to that 
crop across all farms in each district by the total irrigated acreage of that crop in each district. 
These measures of water-use per crop in each CRD are then applied to Census estimates of 
irrigated acreage of that crop in each CRD. The share of water coming from groundwater 
sources, surface water and off-farm sources, as well as the share of water applied by drip, gravity 
and sprinkler irrigation systems are calculated similarly. The mean depth of pump impellors is 
the mean across farms in each district. All values are weighted to represent population means.  
Because the FRIS is conducted in the year after the Census, it is necessary to assume that 
crop-level water application rates will vary in insignificant ways within a one-year period. While 
this is a stringent assumption, there is evidence that makes it bearable. Moore et al. (1994a and 
1994b) show that, based on farm-level data, water application rates are consistent with behavior 
based on either a fixed, allocatable input model, or a behavioral model where water is applied 
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based on crop acreage. Just et al. (1990) conclude that satisficing or „rule of thumb‟ behavior 
explains water applications better than a variable input model. Therefore, if farmers apply water 
based on a rule of thumb for a crop, and water use is primarily determined when crop allocation 
decisions are made, water application rates should vary little within a one-year time frame. This 
is consistent with treating water as a quasi-fixed input whose levels adjust relatively slowly. 
 
4.2 Cost Data 
Total cost is the sum of four categories of cost: fuel, chemicals, labor and other. Costs in 
each category are the sums of the appropriate costs in the Census. The category for other 
includes seeds, repair and maintenance, and miscellaneous expenses (excluding the category for 
“other miscellaneous” which includes costs associated with livestock.) One problem with the 
data is that these costs categories are not identical for each Census year. One reason for this is 
that categories are dropped from the Census as they become less relevant for farmers. In order to 
obtain the most accurate estimate of profit, the most complete definition of cost available in each 
Census is subtracted from total revenue, thereby allowing the specification in each cost category 
to vary somewhat across years.  
The variables used to calculate the price indices for each cost category did not vary 
across Census years. The commodities used to construct the fuel price index are gasoline, diesel, 
and light propane gas (whereas the total cost of fuel includes electricity and other fuels.) To the 
extent that electricity prices are highly correlated with gasoline and other fuel prices excluding 
these variables from the fuel index is not a problem. The labor price index includes hired and 
contract labor. The chemical price index is based on two subaggregates: a fertilizer price index 
and a chemical price index. The fertilizer price index is a weighted average of the price of urea 
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and the price of super phosphate for each USDA fertilizer region. The weight for each type of 
fertilizer is the expenditure share in the USDA national fertilizer price index. The price of 
chemicals is the USDA price index for chemicals. Due to the very small regional variation in 
chemical prices, there is essentially no difference between a regional and a national price index 
for chemicals. The price index for other inputs is a national price index for the opposite reason. 
The components of this cost category include so many factors that computing regional prices 
would be prohibitively expensive. 
 
4.3 Revenue Data 
Total revenue is calculated by multiplying each crop by its price, and summing these 
products into the appropriate output category (field crops, vegetables, or orchards.) The field 
crop category includes alfalfa, barley, corn for grain, upland and long-staple cotton, dried beans, 
oats, peanuts, potatoes, sweet potatoes, rice, rye, sorghum, soybeans, sugar beets, sugarcane, 
tobacco, all wheat, and all hay. The crops included in the vegetable category are bell peppers, 
snap beans, broccoli, cabbage, cantaloupe, carrots, celery, cauliflower, cucumber, sweet corn, 
lettuce, peas, onions, strawberries, tomatoes, and watermelons. The crops included in the orchard 
variable are almonds, apples, apricots, avocados, blueberries, cherries, grapes, grapefruit, 
hazelnuts, lemons, nectarines, oranges, peaches, pecans, pears, pistachios, plums, tangerines, and 
tangelos. These categories are fairly exhaustive in order to capture variation in outputs (and 
sensitivity to various prices) among many different regions. Crop prices are state-level, weighted 
means of each crop price over the entire year, (rather than spot prices) as reported by the 
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) of the USDA.  
 
 61 
 
 
4.4 Fisher Price and Quantity Indices  
The chained Fisher ideal price index is used to construct input and output price indices 
for each CRD. The Fisher price index is a superlative index that is exact for the square root of a 
homogeneous quadratic function (Lau 1979). There is a pleasing consistency in using an 
aggregator function that is the same as the flexible functional form used to estimate the profit 
function, however, since this model proposes to use the Minflex Laurent GL as well as the 
translog, such consistency is not possible. On the other hand, the Fisher index has many pleasing 
attributes that lead Diewert (1978) to recommend it.  One of these attributes is that it is consistent 
when moving forward or backward in time. This enables us to chain link each CRD‟s index to a 
base measure in north Florida for 1992. This region is selected since it grows many of the crops 
in each category, thus allowing a sound basis of comparison. Moreover, it is a region familiar to 
the author, which allows inconsistencies in the data to be identified. The year 1992 is selected to 
provide the greatest similarity in categories across Census years. Chaining the indexes this way 
incorporates geographic variation in prices and outputs as well as variation over time in each 
CRD. (Diewert (1978) finds that superlative indices are approximately consistent in aggregation, 
and the approximation is closer when using chained indices.)  
The index is computed using the following equation: 
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where Pi is the price index for the ith category, and j counts the commodities within each 
category i. Output categories are orchards, vegetables and field crops. Input categories are fuel, 
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chemicals, labor and other. For the year 1992, the superscript 0 represents the base crop reporting 
district in north Florida and superscript 1 represents a given crop reporting district. This 
calculation is repeated for each CRD. For the years 1997, and 1987, superscript 0 denotes prices 
and quantities for a given CRD in 1992, while superscript 1 denotes the current year. For 1982, 
superscript 0 denotes prices and quantities for each CRD in 1987, and superscript 1 denotes 1982 
prices and quantities.  
Following Allen and Diewert (1981), implicit Fisher quantity indices are calculated from 
each price index. Allen and Diewert argue that when there is greater variation in quantities across 
regions than in prices, the bounds of the quantity index can be reduced by using the implicit 
Fisher quantity index. The implicit Fisher Quantity Index is as follows: 
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In order to aggregate data across farms it is necessary to assume there are no economies 
of scale in productions, and that weak separability exists across cost and revenue categories. 
Separability is the concept formalized independently by Sono in 1945 and by Leontief in 1947.  
When factors of production are separated into groups, and the marginal rates of technical 
substitution between pairs of factors in a group are independent of the levels of factors outside 
that group, then that group is separable. An alternative definition is that the Allen partial 
elasticities of substitution between a factor in the separable group and a factor outside that group 
be the same for all factors in the separable group (see Blackorby, Primont and Russell, 1978, 
Chambers, 1988, and Denny and Fuss, 1977).   
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Separability clearly exists when the factors in the separable group are perfect substitutes 
for each other, or when they are used in fixed proportion. More generally, separability arises 
when a group of factors is used independently of other factors to provide a service or 
intermediate input (Bliss, 1975).  This is consistent with production that is decentralized or 
optimized by stages. The importance of separability is that it allows the aggregation of inputs 
into groups without a loss of information.  It also enables the construction of price indices that 
are consistent with optimal expenditure on the corresponding group.   
Because of the frequency with which separability is treated as a maintained hypothesis in 
analyses of agricultural production, Williams and Shumway (1998) test for homothetic 
separability in state-level agricultural data. For inputs, they find strong support for separability 
among all reasonable permutations of categories. The case for separability in categories of 
outputs is not as strong. They find that food grains and vegetables can be aggregated but that the 
number of categories of all outputs consistent with separable technology is eleven. Aggregation 
of fruit and nuts in particular rarely satisfy sufficient conditions for separability. This is not 
surprising since fruits are frequently grown in large monoculture farms. It is not unlikely that a 
farm specializing in oranges may have non-joint production with a farm growing grapes.  
One way to reduce misspecification due to the inclusion of orchard crops might be to 
treat the orchard variable as a quasi-fixed variable with no explicit estimate of output supply. 
Unfortunately, Epstein offers little support for the existence of separability in quasi-fixed factors 
over time. More comfort can be obtained from Lewbel (1996) and Davis et. al. (2000). They 
show that  while an underlying separable technology may not be supported for fruit and nuts and 
many other aggregated output categories, the data may still allow consistent aggregation if 
relative differences among the individual crop prices and the aggregate category price are 
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independent of the aggregate category price. Lewbel (1996) postulates this, and Davis et. al. 
(2000) empirically show that the data support this for typical aggregate categories of crops, 
including fruit and nut crops. 
 
4.5 Regional Data  
Climate data with thirty-year means for precipitation and temperature, and annual 
weather data on precipitation and temperature, were provided by the Economic Research Service 
of the USDA. This data is based on PRISM GIS spatial measures of climate, which ERS 
overlays on their national land cover data set to develop county-level measures by type of land 
use. Mean precipitation for each crop reporting district is by calculated by averaging annual 
precipitation in millimeters over those counties with cropland. Mean temperature is the mean of 
the average maximum and minimum temperature in each crop reporting district. 
Soil data are from the STATGO data set. This data is generally three-dimensional as 
maps out the depth and volume of soil features.  Dr. Nehring of ERS/USDA has been kind 
enough to make available data he constructed that uses single variable measures for each county. 
These variables convert STATGO data into county level measures based on predominant soil 
features for a county, or by averaging soil characteristics. The soil variables that are 
hypothesized to affect profit in coordination with irrigation are: water holding capacity, level of 
organic material, slope of the land, cation exchange, the amount of clay, salinity, a measure of 
shrinkage and swelling of soil, the level of rockiness in the soil, an index of soil texture, and an 
index of drainage properties of the soil.  
There is no unique measure of soil quality. The first five soil characteristics increase the 
productivity of soil as they increase, up to a point, at which soil productivity declines. Water 
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holding capacity is one measure of the ability of soil to deliver water to plants. The level of 
organic material captures the ability of soil to deliver nutrients and water to plants. The slope of 
the land indicates the ability of the land to remove excess water, although obviously land that is 
too steep is costly to farm. Slope is measured as the highest percent gradient in each district. 
Cation exchange captures the ability of soil to supply nutrients to the root system of plants. 
Salinity, shrinkage and swelling, and rockiness are factors that lower soil productivity. Salt that 
is delivered with certain amounts of irrigation water can damage plants. Shrinkage and swelling 
occurs in certain soils with high clay content. It can be destructive to plants and costly to farm 
soils that expand and contract significantly with the available water. The last two measures are 
indexes that group the effects of many factors into a single measure of soil texture and the 
drainage properties of soil. 
Characteristics of irrigation technology for each CRD are obtained from the Farm and 
Ranch Irrigation Surveys, which are conducted in the years following the Census. These include: 
the share of irrigation water that is applied using gravity, sprinkler or drip systems, the share of 
water that is from groundwater sources, surface water sources, or off-farm sources, and the mean 
depths to the impellor pump and to the aquifer. Finally, two variables are constructed to measure 
the ability of farmers to transfer water to more valuable off-farm uses. The first is states‟ water 
rights regimes. Because of the complex and changing nature of states‟ water rights laws 
concerning surface water and groundwater (which frequently differ, despite the fungibility 
between surface and groundwater), water rights regimes were simply divided into two 
categories: prior appropriation, and other (which includes primarily riparian and administered 
water permits.) This data was obtained from the web page of each state‟s water department or 
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from published manuscripts. Unfortunately, the pattern of water rights almost exactly mirrors the 
division into Regions 1, characterized by prior appropriation, and Region 2.  
A second, and broader, measure of farmers‟ ability to transfer water is the number of 
water transactions that occurred in each state between 1990 and 2003. This variable takes into 
account not only the legal environment, but also geographic factors such as the availability of 
buyers downstream from sellers. This data is derived from work by Adams et al. (2004) who 
document transactions involving the sale of water rights, and the leasing of water, from 1990 to 
2003 based on notification of water transfers in two industry journals, Water Strategist and 
Water Intelligence Monthly.  
Some of the total revenue data and the ensuing price index had to be adjusted to protect 
the privacy of „lone farmers.‟ If three or fewer farmers in a CRD produced a single crop, then 
their output was pooled with other lone farmers and the average output of these farmers is used 
to replace individual farmers. The consequences of these alterations on the data are negligible 
since in the twenty cases it was found necessary to adjust the data for orchards (15 for 
vegetables) this technique replaced a variety of small numbers with a uniform small number. 
Total revenue data comes from self-reported total revenue wherever possible. However, in cases 
where aggregate total revenue is inconsistent with more detailed data then these figures are 
replaced with the sum of price times output for each crop.  
Missing values and zeros in the price index for orchards were replaced using the country-
product dummy technique used by Theil et al. (1989). This technique substitutes weighted mean 
values for missing values. The weighted means are predicted values based on regressing the 
orchard price index on year and region dummy variables. Half of these observations ultimately 
are dropped from the profit function due to difficulties with the variables measuring depth to the 
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pump impellor or aquifer. In some regions, particularly those that apply very little irrigation 
water, there was apparently some confusion among farmers on how to answer this question, 
which resulted in 71 missing values for this variable. Because of the compounded problems with 
many of these observations they were excluded from the regression on profit. 
Summary statistics are presented in table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1. Mean , Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum, and Skewness of Variables in 
Data.  
 N Mean 
St. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Profit per Acre (Dollars/Acre) 497 191.06 187.26 0.48 2,105.30 4.28 
Q. Index Vegetables 497 171.67 312.64 0.00 2,585.57 5.27 
Q. Index Fld Crops 497 170.97 190.95 0.37 1,971.40 4.53 
Q. Index Fuel 497 -99.55 63.77 -1,110.15 -2.04 -8.24 
Q.Index Labor 497 -105.3 76.67 -915.02 -0.21 -2.99 
Q. Index Chemicals 497 -85.47 48.05 -555.90 -0.18 -2.06 
P. Index Vegetables 497 82.10 29.60 7.92 228.63 0.76 
P. Index Fld Crops 497 96.57 33.62 9.07 289.93 1.58 
P. Index Fuel 497 117.67 38.32 67.26 271.08 1.04 
P. Index Other 497 108.75 10.98 100.00 127.49 1.02 
P. Index Labor 497 87.30 9.95 68.07 118.09 0.85 
P. Index Chemicals 497 114.02 16.84 91.65 158.19 0.80 
Water (Acre-ft/Acre) 497 0.79 1.02 0.00 4.82 1.72 
Value Machinery ($/Acre) 497 361.66 204.97 130.42 1,552.79 2.23 
Orchards (Acres) 497 31,635 148,690 0.50 1,684,831 8.11 
Share Gravity Irrig. 497 0.44 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.13 
Share Ground Water 497 0.52 0.37 0.00 1.00 -0.11 
Annual Precipitation (mm) 497 815.97 476.88 86.50 2,037.33 0.45 
Mean Temp. (Degrees Celius) 497 13.66 4.72 1.91 23.62 -0.11 
Slope (ft/100ft) 497 6.88 5.00 0.75 27.21 1.45 
Drainage Index 497 6.61 1.28 3.93 9.84 0.45 
Cation Exchange 497 8.09 4.79 0.00 25.83 0.63 
Number Market Exchanges 497 59.13 87.75 0.00 330.00 1.95 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter starts with a general discussion of the profit function estimates. A detailed 
discussion of both the translog and the Minflex Laurent Generalized Leontief systems is left to 
the appendix. The overall demand for water is discussed in section 5.1. This section graphs water 
demand, calculates water price elasticities, and analyzes the marginal value of water component 
by component. In general, the water demand curve is well-shaped, and elastic for most water 
quantities.  
The regional variation in estimated water values follows in section 5.2. Water prices in 
the West tend to be much lower than in the rest of the country. Water values are negatively 
correlated with water use per acre and with profit per acre. In order to put marginal water values 
in context with other input prices, implicit expenditure on water and relative profit and cost 
shares of inputs are presented in section 5.3.  Water is shown to be quite an important input. If 
farmers were required to pay for water at a price equal to its marginal value product, in many 
cases they would spend more on water than on labor. In section 5.4 the effects of federal farm 
policy on water values across regions are considered. Federal farm policies are found to lower 
water values, with the magnitude of the effect varying widely by state. 
The data fit the MLGL model reasonably well. Tests of the null-hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero are strongly rejected with p-values less than 0.0001 for both 
models. Table 5.1 provides various measures of goodness-of-fit for the translog and the  
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Table 5.1. Measures of Sum of Squared Errors, Root Mean 
Squared Error, R-Squared, and the Akaike Information 
Criterion for the Minflex Laurent Generalized Leontief 
and Translog Models. 
Equation SSE 
Root 
MSE Akaike 
MLGL 
4,858,133 102.60 4,943.87 
QV 64,628,655 355.10 6,287.05 
QR 32,721,235 252.60 5,933.80 
QF 7,089,204 117.70 5,140.01 
QL 9,041,677 132.80 5,266.27 
QC 3,460,658 82.13 4,767.83 
Translog 
Ln(  145 0.561 -160.63 
SV 3,964 2.839 554.20 
SR 120,142 15.627 1,290.52 
SF 5,403 3.314 621.02 
SL 11,400 4.814 782.19 
 
 
MLGL models.  The R-squared measure of correlation between predicted and actual profit is 
quite high for the MLGL model at 0.72, while it is 0.52 for the translog model. On the other 
hand, the Akaike Information Criterion favors the translog model as it rewards the model‟s less-
profligate use of parameters (53 versus 89) and its lower sum of squared errors. 
10
 
Unfortunately, both models display violations of the theoretical characteristics of profit 
functions. Neither function is convex in prices for any observation.  Moreover, both show limited 
monotonicity. The MLGL function is consistent with monotonicity for 130 observations, while 
the translog is monotonic in prices for 64 observations. Most of these problems relate to 
vegetable prices. Predicted vegetable supply is positive for 202 observations in the MLGL model 
                                                 
10
 In an attempt to alleviate the difficulty of comparing residuals in log-space with residuals in dollars, the Akaike 
Information Criteria is recalculated using the exponentials of the log residuals. The criterion increases to 342, but 
does not change the above conclusions. 
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compared to over 400 for field crops and the factor demand equations. The translog model 
exhibits the same pattern. The output supply elasticity for vegetables is negative in the translog 
model, while in the MLGL model most of the cross price elasticities for vegetables are restricted 
to zero due to boundary constraints on vegetable coefficients. 
Despite the possible misspecification of the profit function with respect to prices, 
estimating the profit system controls for the effects of these variables on the value of water. 
Indeed, the behavior of the quasi-fixed variables is more consistent with theory, especially in the 
MLGL model. This is seen in the concavity of the profit function with respect to the quasi-fixed 
variables, water and machinery. In the MLGL model these inputs are consistent with concavity 
for 195 observations, whereas no observation is consistent with concavity for these variables in 
the translog function.  
 
5.1 The Demand for Water 
The components of the shadow value of water are presented in table 5.2. These are the 
specific coefficients from table A.1 that generate the shadow value of water in equation (3.14).  
While the complexity of the function makes it difficult to interpret the signs of all the 
coefficients, some observations can be made. The significance of the individual water term ( 2) 
suggests that irrigation water affects profit significantly, albeit in a nonlinear manner. All of the 
direct cross-price terms of inputs with water ( 2j‟s) are significant at the 99 percent level, except 
for wages. These terms also have the expected sign in determining the shadow value of water. 
Increases in input prices lower the value of water, except for the price of other inputs. This latter 
index is a national index used to proxy structural changes in agriculture over time. Increases in 
the price of field crops lower water values while vegetable prices positively affect water values. 
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The implication is that marginal value product of water in field crops is lower than it is in 
vegetables. Orchards and machinery do not interact with water to affect profit significantly.  
Of the regional or geological factors, only temperature is statistically significant.  Water 
is more valuable in warmer regions. The signs of the other factors, however, are reasonable. 
Drier regions with soils that are able to exchange nutrients well, and not too steep or too well-
drained, are associated with higher water values. Gravity irrigation, which is low cost and uses 
water more intensively, is associated with lower water values. The magnitude of these effects is 
discussed below. 
 
5.1.1  Water Demand Curve 
By varying the quantity of water in equation (3.14) while holding the other variables 
constant at their means, a price-quantity schedule of water can be calculated. This is effectively 
the demand for water over all regions and time periods. It is plotted in figure 5.1. As can be seen 
from this graph, at the mean value of 0.79 acre-feet per acre
11
, the shadow price of water is 
$44.14. This value is well within the range of values reported in Frederick et al (1996). The slope 
of the demand curve at this point is negative $45.91 per acre-foot, or a $3.77 decline for each 
additional inch of water applied over an acre.   
The elasticity of demand at predicted mean values is –1.27, which shows the demand for 
water to be elastic. Demand remains elastic over most water use ranges, finally turning inelastic 
                                                 
11
 This figure applies to water spread over all acreage, not just irrigated acreage. That is, acre-feet per acre is the 
total amount of water applied, divided by total harvested acres, without distinguishing between irrigated and un-
irrigated acreage. 
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Table 5.2. Estimated Coefficients Used to Calculate the Shadow Value of Water, with 
Standard Errors in Parentheses from Equation (3.14). 
Nam e  Est im at e  Nam e  Est im at e 
Z
W
0.5
  (
W
)  -837.678**  P
R
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 22)  -20.182 
    (282.4)      (10.98) 
Z
W
  (
WW
)  -62.1769  P
F
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 23)  -71.2755** 
    (53.16)        (20.264) 
Z
W
 Transact ions  ( 1)  0.0443  P
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 24)  497.3269** 
    (0.084)      (83.632) 
Z
W
 Share-gravit y Ir r  (  2)  -38.5934  P
L
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 25)  -36.1553 
    (23.275)      (31.592) 
Z
W
 Share-ground W  (  3)  -21.705  P
C
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 26)  -187.443** 
    (20.267)      (42.751) 
Z
W
 Precip   (  4)  -0.0336  (Z
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
)
-1 
  ( 12)  0.0352 
    (0.025)      (0.062) 
Z
W
 Tem p  (  5)  9.2444**  (Z
W
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
  ( 23)  -3.3964 
    (1.33)      (2.07) 
Z
W
 Slope  (  6)  -2.2737  (P
V
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
 ( 22)  7.4826 
    (2.05)      (17.317) 
Z
W
 Drainage  (  7)  -4.8498  (P
R
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 22)  -149.692* 
    (3.559)      (60.446) 
Z
W
 Cat ion-Exch  (  8)  1.7125  (P
F
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
)
-1
   ( 23)  -170.367* 
    (1.487)      (81.017) 
Z
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 12)  -1.6018  (P
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 24)  1260.688* 
    (1.535)      (491.3) 
Z
W
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   (  23)  -166.473  (P
L
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
    ( 25)  -232.261 
    (136.3)      (129.9) 
P
V
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 21)  5.248  ( Z
W
0.5
 P
C
0.5
  )
-1
  ( 26)  -609.72 
    (9.544)      (369.3) 
       A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
 
at a very low 0.025 acre-feet per acre. This result differs from that in most studies. In fact, 
Gardner (1983) tries to make the point that the demand for water could be elastic despite the 
results of most studies. Nevertheless, the elasticities that he cites to make his case are all very 
close to unit elasticity.  
Possible explanations for the elastic result in this model are revealing of the state of water 
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           Figure 5.1. Derived Demand for Irrigation Water at Predicted Means. 
 
demand studies in general. Most studies of water demand treat the price of water as the cost of 
pumping groundwater. This model treats the price of water as the marginal value product (MVP) 
of water, that is, the value of water to farmers. It is not unreasonable to expect farmers to be 
more sensitive to changes in the value of water than to changes in the cost-price of water – 
especially if the cost of water is far below its value.  Moore et al. (1994) calculate mean pumping 
costs in western and plains states ranging from $16.81 to $23.41. As is shown in the section on 
regional water values below, these costs are below the predicted mean water values for many of 
the states in these regions.
12
 Schaible cites Bureau of Reclamation prices ranging from 3.8 
percent to 53.8 percent of full-cost equivalent prices.  
                                                 
12
 The 99 percent confidence interval for the shadow price of water at sample means is $3.50 to $85.38. Pumping 
costs appear to fall within that range for the sample as a whole, although it depends on the standard deviation of the 
cost of pumping.  
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A second explanation for inelastic water demands is that they arise from studies in a 
single region with relatively little variation in water use due to similar crop patterns and 
geographic factors. This study, in contrast, includes an extensive range of water uses across 
conditions, effectively allowing for greater changes in the quantity of water demanded. 
Obviously farmers in more homogeneous regions may not respond as flexibly as an elasticity of -
1.27 suggests they would. On the other hand, this does explain the incentive to transfer water 
over long distances when geography allows. 
One implication of an elastic water demand is that shifting water out of agriculture might 
have less effect on water values than previously suggested. Even western states that use a 
relatively large volume of water may find that a large decrease in the quantity of water applied 
has a relatively small effect on the dollar value of water. This could help to explain the 
development of markets that tend to transfer water out of agriculture. Adams et al. (2004) tell us 
that in all water transactions from 1990 to 2003, nearly every sale and the majority of leases 
moved water out of agriculture. Howitt and Lund (1999) note that the cheapest source of new 
water for urban demand is fallowed agricultural land. Since farmers tend to sell surface water 
and replace it with groundwater, this is another reason that the share of groundwater irrigation 
might increase water values. 
The problems that can arise from using a multi-output profit model to estimate water 
values are discussed above and in the Appendix.  One advantage of using such a comprehensive 
model is that the shadow price of water can be broken into its components to identify the factors 
that are the most important economic determinants of water value.  In this section those values 
are calculated at predicted mean levels of the data. In the regional water demand section below, 
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we consider how regional changes in the mean values of the data affect water values across 
regions.  
Recall that the predicted mean value of water is $44.44. There are two sets of factors that 
act as intercepts in the water demand equation. The first is the intercept WW which equals -
$62.18. The second is the sum of the geographic factors (Xi‟s), which equals $41.38. The most 
important geographic factors are temperature ($128), soil drainage (-$32), precipitation (-$28), 
share of gravity irrigation (-$16), and share of groundwater (-$11),. All other factors affect water 
prices through the slope of the demand curve. Many of these have much larger effects. These 
magnitudes are presented in table 5.5 in the following section, where they are discussed in terms 
of regional differences in water values. 
Overall, the most important factors affecting water value are the prices of inputs. The two 
with the largest effects are the price of chemicals and the price of other inputs. The price of other 
inputs is used to control for unexplained national events that affect the entire industry over time. 
Although the magnitude of its effect depends on the quantity of water (QW), its value does not 
change across regions. The dollar value of this factor is $2,594.63. The next largest factor is the 
price of chemicals which lowers the value of water by -$1000.44. The price of fuels (-$386.91), 
and wages (-$168.70) also have large effects on the value of water.  
Outputs have much smaller effects on water values. The price of vegetables contributes 
$23.71 to the value of water, while production of orchards subtracts $20.81 from the value of 
water. The price of field crops has a larger effect, lowering the value of water by -$99.41. This is 
consistent with Moss and de Bodisco (1998), and Moore et al. (1994b). Water demand falls as 
farmers shift into crops that use water less intensively. When field crops are less profitable than 
vegetables and orchards, the marginal value product of water will fall for two reasons: a given 
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quantity of water is less productive in field crops, and the field crops produced are relatively less 
valuable.  
Counter intuitively, the value of machinery lowers the value of water by -$49.89. This 
result suggests that there may be structural differences between vegetable farms and farms 
growing field crops, which are not captured in this model. In general, regions that grow fruit and 
vegetables tend to farm intensively, using a lot of machinery and water. These regions have high 
levels of profit per acre and low marginal water prices. Apparently, the machinery variable in the 
water demand equation is picking up a part of that correlation that is not explained by the other 
variables. 
 
5.1.2  Water Elasticities 
Another way to analyze the effects of inputs and outputs on water values is to measure 
directly the sensitivity of water values to changes in input and output prices. This has the added 
benefit that the statistical significance of these effects can be tested. These sensitivity measures 
are similar conceptually to cross-price elasticities, except that they measure the percent change in 
the shadow price of water rather than the quantity of water resulting from the change in the price 
of another good.  
 
W
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Wi
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PZZP
P
P 34
1
*    (5.1) 
 
Linear approximation of the standard errors for these values are estimated in SAS by treating 
each elasticity evaluated at predicted means as a restriction on the model.  
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The results in table 5.3 confirm that an increase in the price of vegetables increases the 
value of water, while an increase in the quantity of orchards lowers the value of water. It can 
now be seen that not only are the magnitudes of these effects relatively small, they are 
statistically insignificant. A ten percent increase in the price of vegetables increases water values 
by 3.9 percent. This result may be due to relatively high variation in the price index for 
vegetables. 
A ten percent increase in the price of field crops lowers the marginal value of water by 
11.6 percent. While this result is not statistically significant, the same negative effect is found in 
Moss and de Bodisco (1998). Since field crops tend to use water less intensively than vegetables 
or orchards, a given quantity of water would have lower marginal value product when applied to 
field crops. This is a substitution effect that lowers the value of water. If the sign of this variable 
is borne out in practice, federal farm programs could actually lower the value of water to 
farmers. The effect of changes in field prices due to federal farm programs is analyzed in detail 
after regional water values are discussed. These results suggest that the lack of statistical 
significance in output price elasticities may be due to price reactions that vary considerably by 
region.  
As would be expected for complements in production, an increase in the price of inputs 
lowers the shadow price of water. Normally an increase in the price of a complement would 
lower the quantity demanded of water, but assuming a positively sloped supply curve, this would 
also lower the water price. Table 5.3 shows these effects to be quite large. A ten percent increase 
in the price of chemicals lowers the value of water 124 percent; a result that is statistically  
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Table 5.3. Cross-Price Elasticities of the Price of Water with Input and Output Prices 
and the Value Of Machinery with Linearized Standard Errors. 
Term  Estimate  Term  Estimate 
Price of Water (PW)  44.443*  PW/Pr Fuel  -4.865 
  (20.891)    (2.709) 
Pr Machinery (PM)  0.450**  PW/Pr Othr  32.495* 
  (0.115)    (16.452) 
PW/Q Orch  -0.269  PW/Pr Lab  -1.968 
  (0.357)    (1.922) 
PW/Pr Veg  0.299  PW/Pr Chem  -12.44* 
  (0.564)    (6.255) 
PW/Pr Fld   -1.155  PW/Q Mach  -0.596 
    (0.833)       (0.559) 
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.  
 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  Increases in fuel prices and wage rates of ten 
percent lower the value of water by 49 percent and 20 percent, respectively, but these effects are 
not statistically significant. Edwards et al. (1996) find water values that are less sensitive to 
electricity prices. They find that a ten percent increase in electricity prices reduces water use by 
2.7 percent in Arizona and 3.3 percent in Colorado – implying cross price elasticities of -0.64 
and -0.68 respectively. While water prices in this model appear to be extremely sensitive to input 
prices, in practice these effects are more muted. National markets for chemicals and fuel result in 
relatively small differences in these prices across regions, suggesting that much of this effect 
may be due to changes in input prices over time. 
The price of other goods has a strong positive effect on the value of water that is 
significant at a 99 percent confidence level. A ten percent increase in the price of other goods 
increases the value of water by 325 percent. While this is consistent with the national-level price 
index acting as a proxy for structural changes in farming over time, it is a very large effect. The 
magnitude of the effect of this factor on water values is placed in the context of this model in 
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table 5.5, when the components of water price are analyzed by state. A ten percent increase in the 
value of machinery lowers the value of water by six percent. This counter intuitive result is not 
statistically significant. As mentioned above, this negative correlation may result from the fact 
that regions with high values of machinery tend to use water intensively with concomitantly 
lower water values. Due to limitations in the data, the implicit marginal value product of 
machinery is not as well-defined in this model as is the MVP of water. A one dollar increase in 
the value of machinery increases profit by $0.45 in real terms. This is a very large return on 
investment, which may reflect structural differences in production across regions. Those regions 
that use capital intensively have higher profit. Therefore, spending more on capital shows a high 
return.   
 
5.2 The Regional Value of Water 
The shadow prices of water from equation (3.14) (labeled MVP of water), calculated at 
predicted mean values for each region and state, are presented in table 5.4. This table also shows 
the mean profit per acre, the total water applied, and mean irrigation in acre-feet per acre. For 
purposes of comparison, the marginal value product (MVP) of machinery and implicit water 
expenditure are also shown. Implicit expenditure is the amount farmers would be spending on 
water if they paid their marginal value product (or shadow price) for it. Three results stand out 
clearly. First, areas that use less water per acre have higher marginal value products of water, and 
vice versa. Second, seven states have negative marginal values for water, three of which are  
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Table 5.4. Mean Value By State of Water Price, Per Acre Simulated Water Expenditure, Profit, 
Water Use, Total Water Use and Marginal Value Product of Machinery. 
State  
MVP 
Water  
Water 
Expend  
Predicted 
Profit  
Water 
Use  
Total 
Water 
1997  
MVP 
Mach. 
  
$/Acre-
foot  $/Acre  $/Acre  
Acre-
ft/Acre  Acre-feet  $ 
Total  44.14  12.91  155.61  0.75  64,963,198  0.45 
Region 1  -16.62  -11.73  242.97  1.5  40,115,315  0.45 
AZ  37.3  177.83  264.2  4.18  3,923,901  0.38 
CA  -54.73  -80.72  548.56  2.16  19,478,591  0.91 
CO  10.24  6.1  119.56  0.95  2,938,973  0.25 
FL  114.91  94.12  282.46  0.69  2,821,497  0.41 
ID  -37.34  -38.66  212.44  1.32  4,322,689  0.31 
NV  -72.21  -181.35  127.98  2.85  712,663  0.74 
NM  9.24  24.42  185.05  1.98  1,083,853  0.26 
OR  -25.14  -26.09  289.95  0.85  1,434,530  0.48 
TX*  111.13  67.05  76.29  0.5  6,471,958  0.8 
UT  -57.33  -89.06  108.18  1.65  859,227  0.3 
WA  -8.64  -2.44  274.01  0.54  2,781,791  0.39 
MT*  28.03  8.85  82.57  0.31  876,778  0.18 
WY*  -38.74  -46.91  53.52  1.08  883,170  0.29 
Region 2  152.75  29.61  96.42  0.26  24,847,883  0.47 
AR  202.15  54.21  77.57  0.3  4,926,687  0.38 
GA  377.48  24.44  115.34  0.07  543,542  0.31 
KS  202.78  27.98  79.24  0.17  3,116,567  0.33 
LA  294.34  32.11  142.76  0.17  1,380,172  0.3 
MS  321.19  16.72  110.71  0.09  1,087,604  0.39 
NE  74.22  35.13  137.14  0.48  4,831,952  0.23 
OK   349.72   13.31   55.27   0.08   487,053   0.44 
    * Texas, Montana and Wyoming have crop reporting districts in both regions. 
 
significantly different from zero.Third, the marginal value of water per acre-foot is inversely 
related to profit per acre, which is illustrated in figure 5.2. 
Diminishing marginal value product of water is consistent with economic theory in that 
as local water supplies increase, water is applied to crops with lower returns. All six of the states 
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with the highest marginal water values, also apply the smallest amounts of water per acre. Those 
states are Georgia, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Kansas, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Five of these states 
apply, on average, enough water to cover all cropped acreage to a depth of less than two inches 
of irrigation water. The value of water in the five low-irrigation states ranges from $377 per acre-
foot in Georgia to $202 per acre-foot in Arkansas. In contrast, the seven states that apply water 
most heavily, Arizona, Nevada, California, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming have five 
of the lowest water values. In fact, Arizona and New Mexico are the only two states in this group 
to have positive water values.  
It is somewhat troubling that three estimates, California, Nevada, and Utah, are 
significantly negative. There are several possible explanations for this result. First, it is possible 
that these negative values are capturing water subsidies from federal water projects that supply 
water to farmers below cost. Second, this model could be failing to adequately model profit. For 
example, there is no attempt to model the value of reducing uncertainty in production through 
irrigation. Nor does this model differentiate between the marginal value of water to first rights 
holders who use water in large quantities and those of junior rights holders who have access to 
much less water. Finally, it is possible that these relatively large negative values arise due to the 
greater curvature imposed by the MLGL functional form. In the translog model all three of these 
states have small, positive values that are not significantly different from zero. Also, the mean of 
the estimated water values for each crop reporting district in California is -$55.22, but with a 
standard deviation of 62.87. Thus, based on the standard deviation for an individual state, (rather 
than on the standard error of the model), the value of water in California is not statistically 
different from zero. The same is true for the means and standard deviations for Nevada, and 
Utah.  
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Zero marginal value products are consistent with many estimates of water value, which 
find that farmers are applying water to maximize crop yield, and, or engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior with a pooled resource, either of which would result in a zero marginal value product. 
In addition, this model does not measure the value of irrigation in reducing uncertainty, which 
could increase the value of water in these states. Given that all of the low-water use states are 
east of the Mississippi, and all the high water users are western states, it is likely that there are 
structural differences in production between these two groups that are not captured in this model.  
The third pattern, illustrated in the figure 5.2, is that profit per acre in each state is 
negatively correlated with the marginal value product of water (with a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of -0.41). This may seem counter-intuitive, but it is consistent with concavity of the 
profit function with respect to the quasi-fixed water input. Simple intuition suggests that since 
high-value crops tend to require more water, they would generate a higher return for each acre-
foot of water. However, this is essentially a ceteris paribus argument, that for a given quantity of 
water, a high-value crop such as tomatoes will have a higher marginal value product of water 
compared to a grain such as soybeans. The negative correlation between profit and water value 
arises from the high volume of water being applied in these high-profit regions.
13
 The underlying 
issue, a common one in the West, is the extent to which large profits in agriculture provide the 
political power necessary to increase supply. Not surprisingly, profit per acre is positively 
correlated with both water use per acre (r = 0.42), and total water used in the crop reporting 
                                                 
13
 Table 5.6 in the next section shows total acre-feet of water applied in each state in 1997.  Region 1 uses nearly 
two-thirds of all irrigation water.  California alone accounts for half of that. California applied a massive amount of 
irrigation water in 1997, more than three times as much as the next most prolific user, Texas. Water use in Nebraska, 
Idaho, Arizona, and Colorado also is orders of magnitude larger than in the remaining states. 
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       Figure 5.2. Marginal Value Product of Water and Profit per Acre by State. 
 
area (r = 0.36)
14
. This issue is revisited in the following section by considering the implicit total 
expenditure on water. 
Comparing estimated water values at the state level with those in other studies (for 
convenience, table 2.1 in Ch. 2 is reproduced below), shows that the results from this study tend 
to be within the range of other estimated water values, but in the lower range of values in regions 
with intensive irrigation, and in the upper ranges in regions that apply relatively little water per 
acre. In the Pacific Northwest, Frederick et al (1996) report an average value of water across 
studies of $143 per acre-foot in constant 1994 dollars. On the other hand, in their hedonic model 
based on soil quality, Faux and Perry (1999) find low water values for Oregon, ranging from $9  
 
 
                                                 
14
 The three correlations mentioned in this paragraph are Pearson correlation coefficients. Each is significantly 
different from zero with a 99 percent confidence level. 
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Table 2.1. Water Values for Irrigation by Region, ($/Acre –foot). 
Region  Average  Maximum  Minimum  Number of Values 
Mid-Atlantic  198  198  198  1 
S. Atlantic-Gulf  20  57  0  5 
Tennessee   19  19  19  1 
Upper MI   10  41  0  4 
Lower MI   21  50  0  3 
Souris-Red-
Rainy  
0 
 
0 
 
0  1 
Missouri   18  77  0  17 
AK-White-Red  49  113  0  10 
Texas-Gulf  81  199  0  20 
Rio Grande   33  107  0  8 
Upper CO   5  18  0  4 
Lower CO   88  1,071  0  60 
Great Basin   0  0  0  4 
Pacific NW  143  1,228  0  18 
California    111   756   0   21 
Frederick, VandenBerg and Hanson (1996).     
 
to $44 per acre-foot depending on soil quality. In this study, Washington and Oregon have 
negative water values that are not significantly different from zero.
15
 
Our results for California and Arizona also are closer to the Faux and Perry values (for 
Oregon) than to the linear programming and budget analysis estimates on which Frederick et al. 
principally rely. Frederick et al. report a mean value across studies in California of $111 with the 
lowest value equal to zero.  The value of water for California in this model is considerably lower 
at -$54.73, which is significantly negative. Arizona has the highest water value of any Western 
state at $37.30, despite also applying the most water per acre. Nevertheless, this value is also 
below the value reported by Frederick et al., where the mean of 60 estimates for the lower 
Colorado is $88. In this case, the difference is notsignificant. Nevertheless, the range of values 
                                                 
15
 These three states show the largest disagreement with the translog model. In general water values in both the 
MLGL and translog models show very similar regional patterns, however, the value of these states in the translog 
model range from $52.87 for Oregon to $75.98 for Washington. 
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reported in Frederick et al. is so large, (from zero dollars to over a thousand dollars per acre-
foot), that the results from this model are within the range of other studies, but offer support for 
the lower estimates of water value.  
Most studies find relatively low water values in the Great Basin, the Upper Colorado, and 
the Rio Grande water basins, and results in this model concur. The mean water value from other 
estimates for the Rio Grande region is $33 per acre-foot. This study finds a value of $9.24 for 
New Mexico. Other estimates average $5 per acre-foot in the Upper Colorado, while we estimate 
a value of negative $57.33 for Utah, but $10.34 for Colorado. Four estimates of water values in 
the Great Basin find zero marginal value products for water. Our estimates show a significantly 
negative water value of $72.21 in Nevada. 
 Estimates for Texas are similar to other studies, averaging $81 versus our estimate of 
$111.13. Estimates for the Missouri valley also are in the range of other studies, with some 
disparity on the low side. The mean of other studies reported in Franklin et al. is $18, with a 
range from 0 to $77. This model estimates values ranging from -$38.74 in Wyoming (statistically 
zero) to $32.95 in Montana. On the other hand, Nebraska, Kansas, and other states in the 
Midwest differ considerably from other studies. Water values in Nebraska and Kansas are 
estimated to be $74.22, and $202.78, respectively.  By comparing hedonic models for irrigated 
and non-irrigated land, Torell et al. (1990) find that annual water values are actually lower in 
Nebraska and Kansas than they are in New Mexico. They estimate water values ranging from 
$15 to $25 per acre-foot in New Mexico, which is similar to the result in this model, but our 
estimates for Kansas and Nebraska are orders of magnitude higher.  
This pattern is repeated throughout the Midwest and the Southeast where estimates from 
this model differ considerably from other estimates. The mean value of water in these regions 
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from other studies ranges from $20 in the South Atlantic (with a maximum value of $57), to $49 
in the Arkansas, White, Red Rivers water basin (with a maximum value of $113). The range of 
water values from this model starts at $202.15 per acre-foot in Arkansas to $377.48 per acre-foot 
in Georgia.  Mississippi also falls in this $300 range, which may help to explain why that state 
has the highest growth rates in irrigated acreage of any state in the study between 1992 and 1997.  
One possible explanation for these high water values in the Midwest and South is that 
this model fails to separate water values from land values, since land prices are not included in 
the model. This would be particularly relevant in eastern states where riparian water rights link 
land values and water values. However, the inclusion of variables that capture soil quality should 
capture some of the effects of differences in land values. Also, the fact that many of the regional 
estimates are consistent with other studies, and in fact lower for the West Coast, weakens this 
argument. A more plausible explanation is that the regional perspective offered by this model 
emphasizes the importance of local supply in determining the value of water.  Four of the five 
states with water values exceeding $200 per acre-foot, apply no more than two inches of water 
per acre. According to the pooled demand curve in figure 5.1, when water use falls below 0.45 
acre-feet per acre (approximately 5 inches per acre) water values exceed $120 and increase 
rapidly to over $300.  
Many of the regional results can be summarized by considering two regions. Region 1 is 
characterized as producing more high-value agriculture. It is composed of all the crop reporting 
districts west of the Rocky Mountains, all of Florida, and the coastal districts in Texas. This 
region is the combination of two Farm Resource Regions compiled by Economic Research 
Service of the USDA: the Fruitful Rim and the Basin and Range regions. This region produces 
 88 
 
 
over 80 percent (by value) of all fruits and vegetables in the United States and 20 percent of field 
crops (40% of the total in the sample).  
Region 2 is composed primarily of the Plains, the Prairie, and the lower Mississippi 
regions. As can be seen in table 5.4, farms in Region 1 use resources much more intensively. 
Mean profit per acre in Region 1 is over two and a half times as high as in Region 2. Total water 
use in 1997 is nearly twice as high, and, over the duration of this study, it is nearly three times 
higher than in Region 2. Irrigation per acre is nearly six times higher. Consistent with the theory 
of diminishing marginal value product, the value of water is much higher in Region 2, at $152.75 
per acre-foot compared to -$16.62. 
This leads to the question, “Can all the differences in water value in this model be 
attributed to regional differences in water supply?” The answer appears to be both yes and no. 
By breaking down state water prices into their components we can begin to see the sources for 
regional differences in water values. Table 5.5 shows water prices calculated at predicted mean 
values in the year 1982, and for selected states, by the key components of water value. These are 
dollar values for the year 1982, for each state, and for the overall water price, which is presented 
in the first column. The overall water price components are those that are discussed in section 
5.1.1 above. For example, as discussed previously, temperature contributes $127.79 to the value 
of water estimated for the overall sample. Due to Oregon‟s relatively colder climate, however, 
temperature only increases water values by $99.02 in that state (fifth column, 13
th
 row), whereas 
in Florida temperature increases water values by nearly one hundred dollars more, $194.89 (last 
column, 13
th
 row).  
The second row shows the average amount of water applied per acre for each state. The  
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Table 5.5. Difference in Water Values Across States by Component at State Means.  
  Overall  1982 California Oregon Georgia Oklahoma Florida 
Water Price ($)  44.44 64.53 -54.73 -25.14 377.48 349.72 114.91 
Water Quantity 
(Acre-ft/Acre)  0.87 0.87 2.16 0.85 0.07 0.08 0.69 
Base Price at WQ ($)  44.44 44.44 17.64 43.99 400.64 370.73 52.42 
         
Geographic Terms  
Base 
Dollars    
State 
Dollars    
Slope  -15.49 -15.47 -32.23 -33.63 -11.42 -11.64 -4.31 
Drainage  -31.91 -31.92 -30.33 -30.58 -32.14 -33.74 -27.27 
Cation-x  14.03 14.13 12.44 12.15 1.09 11.45 4.43 
Transactions  2.56 2.55 14.61 0.93 0.00 1.15 0.00 
Share gravity  -16.31 -17.70 -16.96 -7.10 -0.14 -6.91 -6.12 
Share ground  -11.05 -10.73 -9.12 -5.56 -10.66 -13.94 -16.40 
Precip  -28.23 -29.34 -18.46 -20.29 -45.01 -33.50 -49.56 
Temp  127.79 124.26 131.95 99.02 160.89 141.25 194.89 
Subtotal  41.38 35.79 51.90 14.93 62.62 54.12 95.66 
          
Cross-Price Terms  
Base 
Dollars    
State 
Dollars     
Qorch-Water  -20.81 -14.78 -11.76 -7.69 -9.74 -20.69 -10.15 
Pveg-Water  23.71 22.46 20.27 28.00 21.64 20.59 24.23 
Pfld-Water  -99.41 -104.30 -110.38 -84.70 -92.97 -93.93 -107.23 
Pfuel-Water  -386.91 -473.11 -429.71 -404.83 -377.00 -370.45 -383.82 
Pothr-Water  2594.63 2807.65 2594.30 2594.30 2594.30 2594.30 2594.30 
Plabr-Water  -168.70 -165.68 -186.53 -180.07 -164.91 -166.04 -179.52 
Pchem-Water  -1000.44 -1103.01 -1039.92 -1023.05 -981.95 -974.84 -980.07 
Water-Mach  -49.89 -53.73 -66.79 -67.04 -52.74 -44.60 -56.08 
Subtotal  892.18 915.51 769.48 854.92 936.63 944.34 901.66 
Subtotal / Water Q.  1024.65 1050.49 523.29 927.44 3476.96 3350.29 1085.84 
         
Water Quant. Coef.s  -1024.24 -1023.36 -631.85 -970.91 -3171.79 -3034.06 -1070.97 
         
Total    41.78  62.92 -56.66 -28.54 367.79 370.36 110.53 
 
 
third row comes directly from the water demand curve in figure 5.1. It shows the value of water 
at the state mean quantity when all other state values are held equal to overall sample means. If 
quantity differences explain all the difference in water value, then this row should equal the state 
water price in the first row. The differences between the values in the first and third rows are 
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explained by the geographic and cross-price terms in the rows below. Adding the values from the 
cross-price terms and the geographic terms to the third row will give an approximation of the 
state water value. It does not sum exactly because the minor terms in the water demand equation 
are excluded from the table for clarity. 
Looking at the first three rows tells us, first, that water use and real water values have 
changed relatively little over time. Mean water use in 1982 is 0.87 acre feet of water per acre, 
which is identical to overall water use over all years and all states. Second, high water values in 
Georgia, and to a large extent, Oklahoma, are explained primarily by their low water use. 
Finally, low water values in California and Oregon, and high water values in Florida are not 
entirely explained by water usage.  
California uses nearly three times the base amount of water, but this only lowers the 
value of water from $44.44 to $17.64. Looking at the subtotal of geographic factors shows that 
cumulatively, these factors raise California‟s water value by $51.90, roughly ten dollars more 
than they raise the base water price. Within the geographic factors, California‟s higher 
temperatures increase water values $131, while soil slope and drainage lower water values $32 
and $30, respectively. The number of water market transactions is a regional term that is only 
positive for states west of the Rocky Mountains. To the extent that active water markets increase 
water values this factor would increase water values. It increases water values in California by a 
small $14.61. 
Cross-price terms cumulatively add $769.48 to water values in California. Higher 
chemical prices, fuel prices, and labor prices and combine to lower the value of water by more 
than $1607 per acre-foot. Field crop prices lower water values by $110.38, while vegetable 
prices increase water values by 20.27. The price of other inputs increases water values by 
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$2594.30. This value is constant across states, but because the cross-price terms are divided by 
the quantity of water, this value is weighted by mean state water quantities. The total cross-price 
effect after adjusting for mean water quantities is shown in the row below the subtotal: 
subtotal/water Q. State water quantities also affect the size of the water coefficient W. The size 
of this factor, plus the constant WW, is shown in the subsequent row. Summing these two rows 
and the geographic subtotal gives the approximate water value. For California, the two most 
important factors affecting water values are input prices and the quantity of water used. 
Oregon uses close to the mean amount of water per acre, but it actually has a negative 
water value. As with California, input prices, particularly fuel and chemical prices are the 
primary factors lowering the value of water. In addition, a lower mean temperature, and higher 
field crop prices also lower water values relative to the base. For Oregon, the quantity of water 
applied is not a factor. On the other hand, water prices in Georgia and Oklahoma are explained 
primarily by the low quantity of water applied per acre. For Georgia, higher water values caused 
by higher temperatures are offset by more precipitation. Input prices are fairly close to national 
means, but small differences in these prices are magnified by the very small quantity of water in 
the divisor term. 
The state of Florida stands out for a number of reasons. First, it has a relatively high 
value of water despite applying nearly the mean amount of irrigation. Second, the characteristics 
of agricultural production in Florida identify it as a state in Region 1, yet its water value is closer 
to those of Region 2. Also, water is allocated within water management districts using a system 
of permits, but water transfers across district boundaries are discouraged.  Florida applies nearly 
the same amount of water per acre as Oregon, but its water value is much higher at $114.91. 
Much of the increase is due to geographic factors. Higher temperatures increase water values 
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considerably, $194.89 compared to the base effect of $127.79. Compared to Oregon and 
California, the effect is even larger. Level farmland in Florida also increases water values 
relative to the other states, although high levels of precipitation offset these increases. Input and 
output prices explain very little of Florida‟s high water values since they are close to the national 
averages. 
The column for 1982 shows that water values are declining over time. The marginal 
value product of water calculated using mean values for the independent variables for 1982 is 
$64.53. This higher value is explained by a large positive effect from the price of other inputs 
which captures structural changes over time. The price of chemicals and fuels offset these higher 
values to a large extent.  
One final benchmark for comparing water values is the actual market price for water. 
Adams et al. (2004) document transactions involving the sale of water rights, and the leasing of 
water, from 1990 to 2003. The number of transactions by state, and annualized prices are shown 
in table 5.6. Over ninety percent of sales involve farmers selling water rights to cities or industry. 
A significant number of lease transactions (34%) do involve farmers as water recipients. 
Unfortunately, the data do not include the duration of the lease, so annualized water prices 
cannot be calculated for transactions involving farmers as buyers. Sale prices (in 1992 dollars) 
are annualized by discounting the sale price over twenty years at 5.7 percent rate of interest.  
Since these sales transfer water out of agriculture, they indicate the marginal value of 
water in non-agricultural uses. At best these prices represent an approximation of the upper 
envelope of the MVP of water in agriculture, since farmers are always the sellers. In addition, the 
reported values are means over a time period when water prices are rising rapidly. While the raw 
data would be more useful, table 5.6 does indicate the regional variation in markets allocating  
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Table 5.6. Mean Sale Price of Water, Volume and Number of Transactions by 
State 1990-2003. 
State 
# of 
Sales 
Mean 
Volume 
# Ag. 
Buyers 
Total 
Price 
Annualized 
Price 
MVP 
Water 
  
Acre-
feet  
$/acre-
foot Dollars 
$/acre-
foot 
Arizona 34 3,148 0 1,095.98 110.51 37.30 
California 31 16,222 4 1,067.30 107.62 -54.73 
Colorado 5 191 1 2,334.55 235.40 10.24 
Idaho 3 2,360 1 173.80 17.53 -37.34 
Kansas 7 565 0 418.48 42.20 202.78 
Nevada 69 694 0 3,822.02 385.38 -72.21 
New Mexico 36 574 0 1,978.51 199.50 9.24 
Oklahoma 3 2,748 0 1,204.82 121.48 349.72 
Oregon 3 2,748 0 412.58 41.60 -25.14 
Texas 31 2,002 0 600.72 60.57 111.13 
Utah 14 726 1 1,776.02 179.08 -57.33 
Washington 4 4,253 0 4,715.51 475.47 -8.64 
Wyoming 1 56 1 2,191.12 220.94 -38.74 
 
 
water out of agriculture. Nearly all the transactions occur in Region 1. For most states, the 
annualized sale price of water is higher than the MVP of water in agriculture. In Oklahoma and 
Kansas the sale price is lower than the MVP, but there are only 3 and 7 transactions, 
respectively. Given the high variation in the estimated MVP it is quite likely that farmers with 
low water values sold their water rights. The Western states are interesting in that they have 
fairly high sale prices, but negative MVP‟s of water in agriculture. The implication is that water 
is poorly allocated in these states, and reallocating it out of agriculture could significantly 
increase its value. 
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5.3 Implicit Expenditure on Water 
As discussed above, there is negative correlation between profit per acre and the price of 
water. As we have seen, this is at least partly due to the fact that regions with low profits use 
very small amounts of water and therefore have high water prices. Because regions with very 
high water values per acre-foot tend to apply very little water per-acre, these water values may 
be slightly deceptive. A more descriptive measure of water value might be implicit water cost per 
acre. One way to consider both irrigation intensity and water value at the same time is to conduct 
a thought experiment where farmers pay for water at their marginal value product.  
The implicit expenditure on water (per acre) is calculated by multiplying total water use 
per acre in each district by the estimated shadow water price. To the extent that farmers own 
water rights for the water that they use, this implicit expenditure could also be thought of as an 
implicit income stream for water assets. The mean implicit expenditure on water for each state is 
presented above in table 5.4, in order to facilitate comparison with other prices. In contrast to the 
marginal value product of water, implicit expenditure on water is positively correlated with 
profit.  
Looking back at table 5.4, it can be seen that of the six states with the highest mean profit 
per acre, four have negative MVP‟s of water (California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho) while 
the other two, (Arizona, and Florida) have the highest per acre spending on water. The negative 
MVP‟s make this statistic slightly misleading. Western states apply so much water to such a high 
proportion of their acreage that even small positive MVP‟s would generate large expenditures on 
water. In 1997, California used 80% as much water as all the states in Region 2 combined. 
Arizona and Oklahoma provide the most extreme counterpoints. Arizona applies over four acre-
feet of water per acre and its MVP of water is in the lower range at $37.30. If farmers paid this 
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price for water, they would spend $177.83 per harvested acre. Farmers in Oklahoma spread 
roughly an inch of water across all acreage, with a MVP of $349.72. Even paying this high price, 
farmers would only spend $13.31 per acre on water.  
Measuring water value using the implicit expenditure obviously overstates the value of 
water, since water use would fall if farmers had to pay for all of it by the acre-foot. In California, 
for example, junior water-rights holders, who have access to less water than do senior rights 
holders, use water far more efficiently. Caswell and Zilberman (1985) show that the adoption of 
water-saving irrigation technologies is sensitive to the net return on water. Nevertheless, regional 
variation in the implicit expenditure on water emphasizes the important role water plays in high-
value agriculture. It also raises the issue of how valuable water is relative to other inputs. In 
Georgia, for example, the price of water is much higher than profit per acre, but the implicit 
expenditure on water is much lower than profit. 
Table 5.7 shows the share of profit that would be devoted to water expenditures, and 
factor shares of total cost for all inputs including water. The first column is calculated by 
dividing the total profit in each district by the implicit expenditure on water. Cost shares are 
calculated by adding implicit water expenditure to total cost, then dividing expenditure on each 
input by that new total cost. Overall, implicit spending on water accounts for four percent of 
profit and nine percent of total costs. Because of the negative MVP‟s of water, total implicit 
spending on water as a share of profit may be underestimated. In states with positive MVP‟s, 
however, spending on water ranges from 10.5 percent of profit in Mississippi to 46.9 percent in 
Texas. This is a fairly significant share of profit, especially when taking into consideration the 
fact that profit in this model is short-run profit that does not include the cost of interest payments  
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Table 5.7. Implicit Expenditure on Water as a Share of Profit, and the Cost Share of All 
Inputs, Mean by State. 
 
Water Cost as 
Percent of Profit  Percent Share of Total Cost 
State Water  Water Labor Fuel Chemicals Other 
Overall 4.40  9.08 18.79 16.00 25.77 30.37 
Region 1 NA  NA 28.32 16.56 24.00 31.12 
Region 2 20.78  18.67 12.59 14.88 25.45 28.42 
Arizona 34.89  18.71 26.71 11.66 18.17 24.75 
Arkansas 39.18  29.08 12.89 12.37 22.14 23.53 
California NA  NA 38.97 13.04 18.92 29.07 
Colorado 12.05  12.04 18.25 18.05 18.07 33.58 
Florida 24.46  11.26 29.90 8.85 26.66 23.33 
Georgia 25.97  9.74 17.29 12.66 33.74 26.56 
Idaho NA  NA 19.58 15.45 33.32 31.66 
Kansas 27.67  23.74 6.90 16.45 23.30 29.61 
Louisiana 17.64  16.37 17.21 11.39 29.25 25.79 
Mississippi 10.46  8.43 13.53 12.88 36.46 28.69 
Montana 14.40  12.44 13.32 17.96 24.54 31.74 
Nebraska 24.04  21.99 6.88 16.17 24.89 30.07 
Nevada NA  NA 23.99 29.03 14.48 32.50 
New Mexico 14.19  10.61 27.88 18.39 16.87 26.25 
Oklahoma 16.48  10.95 12.44 18.48 24.76 33.37 
Oregon NA  NA 31.88 12.31 27.84 27.97 
Texas 46.90  27.29 14.55 13.32 19.60 25.24 
Utah NA  NA 21.82 25.42 16.43 36.33 
Washington NA  NA 28.59 11.10 28.62 28.94 
Wyoming NA  NA 20.00 24.91 16.37 38.73 
 
 
or unpaid labor.  
There is no strong regional pattern to water expenditures as a share of profit, perhaps due 
to the inability to include many of the Western states. Water values represent a large share of 
profit in both Florida, and Georgia, with expenditures accounting for 24.5 percent and 26 percent 
of profit, respectively. This might help explain why Florida is suing Georgia in Federal court 
over water flows. Elsewhere in the south, Arkansas, at 39 percent, has one of the highest ratios of 
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any state. As the example of rice farmers in Arkansas suggests, farmers in the Southeast may be 
adopting the western model of increasing profit through rent-seeking behavior to increase water 
supplies.  
Since factor shares of profit need not sum to one, it is convenient to use cost shares to 
compare water to other inputs. On average, water expenditures would accountfor nine percent of 
total costs. This is less than all other factors, with the next lowest being the share of costs 
devoted to fuels (16 percent). There are regions, however, where water is a relatively large 
component of total costs. In Arkansas, Texas Kansas, and Nebraska, water expenditure would 
exceed 20 percent of costs, and represent a larger share of total cost than chemicals,  labor, or 
fuel. This suggests that factor productivity studies that fail to include water as a factor could be 
overestimating the productivity of other inputs to a significant degree. 
 
5.4 The Effect of Federal Farm Policy on Water Values 
This model is well-suited (albeit not a general equilibrium model) to capture the effects 
of federal agricultural policies on water values across regions. Two price indices for field crops 
have been constructed. One includes federal subsidies at the farm level by adding all subsidies to 
total revenue then dividing by the quantity of each crop to get a new crop price that includes the 
subsidy. This is the price index for field crops that has been used in the model in previous 
sections. In this section, water values (but not the estimated profit function) are calculated using 
the field-crop price index that excludes all federal agricultural subsidies. This index varies 
regionally from the previous index by the amount that federal  
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 subsidies vary across regions.
16
  The mean differences between the two indices for each state are 
shown in table 5.8. There is significant difference between the two indices, highlighting the 
importance of subsidies in the production of field crops. Overall the price index without 
subsidies averages 22 percent less than the original price index. The decline in field crop prices 
is largest in Colorado, Nebraska, Montana and Kansas, showing the importance of federal 
subsidies to agriculture in those states.  
The shadow price of water is calculated using the water value coefficients from table 5.3, 
except now it is calculated using the field crop index that excludes federal subsidies. These water 
prices also are shown in table 5.8. Overall, water prices increase 26.4 percent as field crop prices 
fall an average of 21.73 percent. This is consistent with the water and field-price cross elasticity, 
although the values in table 5.8 are based on changes in predicted means. One explanation for 
this is that the MVP of water in commodity crops is low, so when the demand for these crops is 
reduced, water is shifted into uses with higher MVP‟s. 
Interestingly the magnitude of the effects varies considerably by state. Not surprisingly, 
the states with the largest decreases in field crop prices are Colorado, Nebraska, Montana, and 
Kansas. Field crop prices in these states fall by approximately 26 to 39 percent without 
government support programs. What may be surprising are the different impacts these changes 
have on water values across states. Water prices increase for these states range from 7 percent in 
Kansas to 74 percent in Montana and 152 percent in Colorado. The states that are least affected  
 
                                                 
16
 The change in field crop prices is projected as a short-run effect from the loss of government revenue. This is not 
a general equilibrium model that projects changes in the output and equilibrium prices of field crops. A second 
unsubsidized water value could be calculated by re-estimating the profit function with subsidies removed from profit 
as well as from the field crop price index. The problem with this approach is that it would adjust total revenue 
without taking into account the effect on total cost of any output response. All of the cost effects would be absorbed 
by the decrease in the value of water. 
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Table 5.8. Shadow Prices of Water and Field Crop Price Indices With and Without 
Federal Crop Subsidies, Means By State and Region. 
State 
MVP 
Water 
Unsubsidized 
MVP Water 
Percent 
Change 
Pr Field 
Crops 
Unsubsidized 
Pr Fld Crops 
Percent 
Change 
Overall 44.14 55.80 26.43 97.06 75.96 -21.73 
Region 1 -16.62 -10.77 35.21 95.08 79.01 -16.90 
Region 2 152.763 172.15 12.69 98.38 73.93 -24.85 
AZ 37.30 41.99 12.58 108.06 88.89 -17.74 
AR 202.15 217.12 7.41 97.44 76.15 -21.85 
CA -54.73 -48.86 10.72 119.66 101.13 -15.48 
CO 10.24 25.76 151.59 66.48 40.84 -38.57 
FL 114.91 122.38 6.50 112.93 98.85 -12.47 
GA 377.48 366.48 2.92 84.89 69.36 -18.29 
ID -37.34 -31.26 16.27 70.38 58.22 -17.28 
KS 202.79 216.85 6.94 87.04 63.74 -26.77 
LA 294.34 306.81 4.23 91.87 72.70 -20.87 
MS 321.19 325.36 1.30 100.69 77.01 -23.52 
MT 28.03 48.73 73.87 107.16 77.56 -27.63 
NE 74.22 95.39 28.52 100.02 67.44 -32.57 
NV -72.21 -71.40 1.13 71.73 69.34 -3.33 
NM 9.24 15.83 71.36 93.92 76.21 -18.86 
OK 349.72 340.74 2.57 86.64 67.10 -22.55 
OR -25.14 -18.92 24.75 70.46 59.87 -15.04 
TX 111.13 130.54 17.46 147.28 112.38 -23.70 
UT -57.33 -51.36 10.41 73.67 60.34 -18.10 
WA -8.64 0.14 101.61 65.56 52.74 -19.55 
WY -38.74 -32.81 15.31 89.03 76.91 -13.61 
 
 
by the policy change are Nevada, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Georgia. The implication here is 
that federal agricultural policies can have significant and regionally asymmetric impacts on water 
demand.  
The fact that the federal commodity program can have such a wide range of effects across 
regions offers several important lessons. First, even the direct effect of the commodity program 
on local prices can vary from a small effect of 3 percent (Nevada) to a large effect of 39 percent 
(Colorado). Second, the sensitivity of water price to changes in the price of field crops also 
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varies widely by region. This further expands the range of effects on water values from a change 
in the commodity program. Thus, relying on the small, and statistically insignificant cross-price 
sensitivity term between water price and field crop price to predict the local effects of a change 
in farm policy would clearly be misleading.  
The same cautionary note is seen in a similar, although simpler, thought experiment 
conducted on the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the value of 
water. Since estimating the actual effects of NAFTA on vegetable prices is beyond the scope of 
this paper, these effects are simulated by decreasing all vegetable prices ten percent. The effects 
of this simulated policy change on the marginal values of water are presented in table 5.9. 
As might be expected from the small cross elasticity between water price and the price of 
vegetables, the overall effects are small. A ten percent decrease in the price of vegetables lowers 
the price of water by 3.1 percent. Nevertheless, even with an uniform change in vegetable prices, 
regional effects on water prices vary considerably. The overall effect on Region 2, where 
relatively few vegetables are grown, is minimal. Water prices in Region 1, on the other hand, 
decline more than the decrease in vegetable prices. The largest effects are in Washington, with a 
26.5 percent decrease in water values, and New Mexico, with a 9.7 percent decline. 
Water prices in Florida are less sensitive to changes in vegetable prices, falling only 1.3 
percent. Once again Colorado water prices react strongly to a change in output price. In this case, 
a ten percent reduction in vegetable prices lowers water prices by 12.3 percent. Montana and 
Idaho also react fairly strongly to a drop in vegetable prices, which is interesting to note, but 
unlikely to be caused by NAFTA since these states primarily produce vegetables for canning. As 
might be expected Georgia, Oklahoma and Kansas are not  
 101 
 
 
 
Table 5.9. Change in Shadow Price of Water due to 
10% Reduction in Vegetable Prices.  
State 
MVP 
Water 
Unsubsidized 
MVP Water 
Percent 
Change 
Overall 44.14 42.77 -3.09 
Region 1 -16.62 -18.51 -11.37 
Region 2 152.763 152.58 -0.12 
Arizona 37.30 36.64 -1.76 
Arkansas 202.15 200.31 -0.91 
California -54.73 -55.43 -1.28 
Colorado 10.24 8.98 -12.30 
Florida 114.91 113.45 -1.27 
Georgia 377.48 374.62 -0.76 
Idaho -37.34 -38.57 -3.31 
Kansas 202.79 200.15 -1.30 
Louisiana 294.34 291.87 -0.84 
Mississippi 321.19 318.41 -0.87 
Montana 28.03 25.94 -7.44 
Nebraska 74.22 72.48 -2.35 
Nevada -72.21 -72.97 -1.05 
New Mexico 9.24 8.34 -9.68 
Oklahoma 349.72 347.12 -0.74 
Oregon -25.14 -26.68 -6.11 
Texas 111.13 109.64 -1.35 
Utah -57.33 -58.24 -1.59 
Washington -8.64 -10.93 -26.48 
Wyoming -38.74 -39.96 -3.13 
 
 
sensitive to price changes in vegetables. Given the varied regional responses to a broad price 
change, it is worth investigating the consequences of specific price changes due to NAFTA. The 
results of this section show that federal farm policies can have large and asymmetric effects on 
the marginal value product of water across the country. Both, commodity price programs and 
trade agreements, can act to significantly reduce the marginal value product of water 
. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This study finds that water values differ significantly across regions. The most important 
determinants of water value are input prices, and the quantity of water applied.  Regional 
variables, such as climate or soil characteristics, and output prices directly affect water values to 
a lesser degree. The implication is that regional factors affect water values primarily by affecting 
farmers‟ crop choices. It is fairly surprising to conclude that the share of irrigation water pumped 
from the ground, or applied using gravity rather than sprinklers, has little effect on water values. 
This suggests that these decisions are not necessarily made on the margins of cost versus benefit, 
but rather due to water supply constraints. Farmers are maximizing profit by adjusting their crop 
mix to account for different regional characteristics. Thus these characteristics have relatively 
small direct effect on water values, but a large indirect effect. One implication of this is that to 
the extent that people and highly profitable, water-intensive crops prefer the same climate, there 
will always be competition for scarce water resources. On the other hand, federal farm programs 
that affect crop choices can have a significant effect on water values and on water use.  
The quantity of irrigation water applied clearly affects water values. Water use is a 
particularly important determinant of water value in regions that use relatively little water. 
Despite this, Torell et al. (1990) is the only regional water-value study to carefully estimate the 
supply of water available to farmers in a particular region. There is a real need for studies that 
carefully model water supply in order to estimate a true supply and demand system. 
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Various articles in the literature emphasize different components of water demand. 
Moore et al. (1994a, 1994b) emphasize the role of output prices, which affect crop mix and the 
demand for water on the extensive margin. Gardner (1983) discusses the interactions among 
water and other inputs. Schaible (1997) and Faux and Perry (1999) consider the role played by 
climate, the characteristics of the aquifer, and soil quality. The current study offers insights into 
the role played by each of the factors mentioned above. This model strongly supports Gardner‟s 
(1983) assertion of the importance of water as a complement to other inputs. This result suggests 
that agricultural productivity analyses that overlook water could be overestimating the 
productivity of other inputs. This study also offers weak support for Schaible (1997), and Faux 
and Perry (1999).  Soil quality, drier regions and ground water share do increase the value of 
water, but these results are small in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
Based on cross-price sensitivities, the relatively small effect output prices have on water 
values offers little support to the conclusion drawn by Moore et al. that water demand is driven 
by changes on the extensive margin through adjustments to crop mix. Crop mix may be relevant, 
but primarily because of its effect on derived demands, rather than in response to changes in 
output prices. Having said this, however, it is important to recall table 5.8, where removing 
commodity subsidies on field crops had varying state-level effects on water values, some quite 
large. Even using the identical profit function and the same data set, local water values vary 
widely in response to a given change. It is no surprise then, that individual studies using different 
models and data sets estimate a very wide range of water values. 
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6.1 Regional Water Values 
Estimating a single demand curve for water across regions is a simplification that 
identifies the effect on water values of differences in local water use and other geographic 
factors. Calculating price indices for each crop reporting district further highlights regional 
differences. An important consequence of this approach is the finding that overall water demand 
is elastic. This may be due to the high degree of variation in water use across regions, or it may 
result from farmers reacting to water values rather than water costs. One argument against such 
an approach is that the supply of water is local, and there is no effective regional market for 
water. Trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin or the Specific Factor Model) makes it clear, however, 
that when competitive markets exist for outputs or other inputs, the price of a fixed factor or a 
non-traded good is at least partly determined by economic forces in other regions. 
In general, the value of this model is that it illuminates the factors that affect the value of 
water across regions. One of the most important factors is a process that starts with the fact that 
higher water application rates allow land to be farmed more intensively. Higher intensity is 
associated with higher profit per acre, but lower values for water. High profits offer farmers an 
incentive to apply political pressure to increase the supply of water to meet demand. As rice 
farmers in Arkansas will attest, the vast majority of Bureau of Reclamation projects to provide 
irrigation water exist west of the Rocky Mountains. The result is relatively low marginal value 
products of water in western states despite a plethora of factors that should increase them: high 
profit per acre, high values of capital per acre, warm climate, and well-drained soils. It is safe to 
say that the MVP of water in the far West is very close to zero, and much, much, lower than the 
value of water in the Midwest or South.  
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The problem is that the MVP of water depends on the quantity of water used. The key 
point here is that when water is allocated administratively, without the equalizing forces of 
markets, using the marginal value product to measure farmers‟ ability-to-pay is itself endogenous 
to administrative decisions. Moore (2000) notices this effect, but simply identifies it as the 
economic consequence of allocating more water to a district. While Moore (2000) uses shadow 
prices of water to conclude that farmers have a greater ability to pay for water than is indicated in 
previous budget-analysis studies, he does not broach the subject of how those prices may vary 
due to administrative decisions on water allocation: As farmers are allocated more water, not 
only do they gain economic rent (if they do not pay the opportunity cost for that water), but the 
more water they are allocated, the lower will be any administrative price based on „efficient‟ (i.e. 
marginal) measures of value. The extent of the problem is clear in Nevada, where the marginal 
value product of water (at predicted mean levels for the state) is statistically zero, but market 
prices for 15 water trades climbed as high as $5,000 per acre/ft in 2002 (Adams et al. 2004). 
  
6.2 Policy Considerations  
Agricultural policies that affect crop prices, particularly commodity credit programs, 
appear to have a significant effect on the demand for water. This is particularly applicable to 
Colorado, Montana and Washington. On the other hand, water policies that transfer water out of 
agriculture may have a relatively small effect on output. Over all regions, a ten percent decrease 
in the quantity of water applied would raise the MVP of water by 7.5 percent. Because 
agriculture in California uses so much water, a ten percent reduction would free up 624 billion 
gallons of water (based on 19 million acre-feet of irrigation water used in California in 1997). 
This represents more than enough water to meet the needs of every resident in the state for one 
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year. Table 5.8 shows, however that the sensitivity of water prices varies considerably by state. 
Reducing water quantity in California is likely to increase water values considerably.  
While the overall effect on agriculture of reducing the supply of water might be relatively 
small, the changes would not be pain free for farmers nor evenly distributed. Even an „efficient‟ 
rationing system that requires farmers to pay some average MVP would impose an uneven 
burden that is heavier on some farmers. Table 5.7 shows that if farmers were to pay such a price 
for all irrigation water such charges could easily account for one-fourth to one-third of profit.
17 
 
As is often the case when the costs of re-allocating resources are concentrated in one industry, a 
relatively small benefit to millions of consumers represents a potentially catastrophic burden on 
individual producers. The very concentrated nature of the costs invariably generates a political 
response. 
A market system where farmers could sell their under-valued water would avoid many of 
these problems. The disparity between the MVP‟s of water and market prices shows high levels 
of allocative inefficiency, thus functioning water markets provide a means to increase the total 
value of water in agriculture. On the other hand, a market system would create problems of its 
own. First there are severe geographic limitations to water transactions. Second, water rights 
doctrines in many states are not amenable to the development of water markets. Even states with 
appropriative rights doctrines are finding increasing numbers of water market transactions 
contested in courts as rights-holders fight over who owns conserved water (Huffaker et al. 
2000).
18
  Third, water markets would be imperfect markets with a patchwork of regulations 
requiring environmental safeguards such as minimum instream flows, and restrictions on 
                                                 
17
 This is, in fact, an under-estimate since profit in this model is short-run profit which does not include interest 
costs, nor does it account for uncompensated labor by farm owners. 
18
 Conserved water comes from water that traditionally had been diverted from a river, but not consumed (and 
therefore returned back to the river for downstream use). New technologies now allow farmers to consume more of 
the water they divert, so less is returned for downstream users. 
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transfers of water out of the hydrological district. Finally, because of the significant economic 
rents involved, political power and rent-seeking behavior will continue to play important roles in 
the allocation of water. 
The above discussion reveals an important weakness in this model. It assumes that water 
is a fixed, allocated input. This is not an uncommon assumption in the literature (e.g. Moore 
2000, and Moore et al. 1994b). In truth we don‟t know when farmers are supply restricted and 
when they are not. Building a model of local supply functions would be an arduous task, but one 
with significant benefits. It would provide a model where the economic rents accruing to water 
could be estimated precisely. This model reports implicit expenditures on water (based on either 
individual or statewide MVP‟s) to illustrate the value of water relative to other inputs. However, 
these figures are based on simplistic assumptions, and are primarily illustrative. We have seen 
how farmers have the ability to adjust the MVP of water by using public resources to augment 
local supply. This has been the focus of much of the research on water demand, but very little of 
it includes equations for water supply. Modeling supply and demand specifically is necessary to 
fully understand the effects of different policy approaches for re-allocating water among farmers, 
industrial and residential consumers, and the environment.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
A.1  THE PROFIT FUNCTION 
 
The estimated parameters from equation 3.12 for the Minflex Laurent Generalized 
Leontief functional form (MLGL) are reported in table A.1. Of the 99 estimated coefficients, 33 
are significant at the five percent level of confidence or better. Because of the complexity of the 
model, these values are discussed in detail as elasticities.  Some general observations can be 
made. Except for temperature, climate and geographic factors do not significantly affect profit 
directly through water use. The only variables to affect profit in a linear fashion are water use, 
and the price of chemicals. Also, ten non-negativity constraints are binding on cross-price terms. 
The vegetable price term is in five of these, while field crop prices are in four.  
The estimated profit function fails tests of convexity in prices for both the minflex 
Laurent and translog functional forms. It should be noted that a failure of convexity should not 
be interpreted strictly as a failure of profit maximization, since convexity can fail for other 
reasons. Wales (1977) demonstrates that with flexible functional forms, convexity may be 
rejected even when the data come from a theoretically consistent technology. A more likely 
explanation is that the profit function is misspecified. The signs of the own-price elasticities may 
reflect some light on these other factors, and the issue is explored further in the elasticities 
section below.  
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Table A.1. Estimated Parameters from the MLGL Profit System with Standard 
Errors in Parentheses. 
Name  Estimate  Name  Estimate 
Const ant   (
0
)  -204387**  Z
W
  ( 22)  -62.1769 
    (67099)      (53.16) 
P
V
0.5
  ( )  -45.4781  Z
M
  ( 33)  -286.535 
    (71.765)      (605.4) 
P
R
0.5
  ( )  -151.176  Z
W
 Transact ions  ( 1)  0.0443 
    (87.346)      (0.084) 
P
F
0.5
  ( )  1054.361**  Z
W
 Share-gravit y Ir r  ( 2)  -38.5934 
    (350.8)      (23.275) 
P
O
0.5
  ( )  10057.5**  Z
W
 Share-grnd W  (  3)  -21.705 
    (1714.5)      (20.267) 
P
L
0.5
  ( )  4436.863  Z
W
 Precip   ( 4)  -0.0336 
    (2975.3)      (0.025) 
P
C
0.5
  ( 6)  -2911.65  Z
W
 Tem p  ( 5)  9.2444** 
    (1918.8)      (1.33) 
P
V
 ( 11)  5.9954*  Z
W
 Slope  ( 6)  -2.2737 
    (2.366)      (2.05) 
P
R
  ( 22)  -1.3318  Z
W
 Drainage  (  7)  -4.8498 
    (2.697)      (3.559) 
P
F
  (  33)  -7.217  Z
W
 Cat ion-Exch  (  8)  1.7125 
    (15.822)      (1.487) 
P
O
 (  44)  1  Z
O
0.5
 P
V
0.5
   ( 11)  0.5189 
    (0)      (0.423) 
P
L
  (  55)  -191.704  Z
O
0.5
 P
R
0.5
   ( 12)  0.5231 
    (159.3)      (0.458) 
P
C
  (  66)  282.1767**  Z
O
0.5
 P
F
0.5
   ( 13)  0.662 
    (99.963)      (0.709) 
Z
O
0.5
  ( 1)  3.6896  Z
O
0.5
 P
O
0.5
   ( 14)  -2.076 
    (10.467)      (3.087) 
Z
W
0.5
  ( 2)  -837.678**  Z
O
0.5
 P
L
0.5
   ( 15)  -0.0888 
    (282.4)      (1.052) 
Z
M
0.5
  ( 3)  1457.929  Z
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 12)  -1.6018 
      (1316.9)      (1.535) 
Z
O
  ( 11)  0.0004  Z
O
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   ( 13)  8.8377 
    (0.003)        (5.81) 
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
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Table A.1 cont. Estimated Parameters from the MLGL Profit System with Standard 
Errors in Parentheses. 
Name  Estimate  Name  Estimate 
Z
O
0.5
 P
C
0.5
    ( 16)  -0.4853  P
F
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   ( 33)  608.1652** 
    (0.991)      (139.7) 
P
V
0.5
 P
R
0.5
    ( 2)  0  P
F
0.5
 P
C
0.5
   ( 36)  48.3253* 
    (0)      (20.692) 
P
V
0.5
 P
F
0.5
   ( 13)  13.243  P
O
0.5
  P
L
0.5
   ( )  -451.121** 
    (7.718)      (150.3) 
P
V
0.5
 P
O
0.5
   ( )  -10.4749  P
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 24)  497.3269** 
    (19.111)      (83.632) 
P
V
0.5
 P
L
0.5
   ( )  0  P
O
0.5
  Z
M
0.5
  ( 34)  -1976.71** 
    (0)      (332.3) 
P
V
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 21)  5.248  P
O
0.5
 P
C
0.5
   ( 46)  -352.972** 
    (9.544)      (135.9) 
P
V
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   ( 31)  -112.153*  P
L
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 25)  -36.1553 
    (49.224)      (31.592) 
P
V
0.5
 P
C
0.5
    ( 16)  0  P
L
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
    ( 35)  504.1957* 
    (0)      (215.5) 
P
R
0.5
 P
F
0.5
   ( 23)  0  P
L
0.5
  P
C
0.5
   ( 56)  0 
    (0)      (0) 
P
R
0.5
 P
O
0.5
   ( 24)  -0.2734  Z
W
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   (  23)  -166.473 
    (18.411)      (136.3) 
P
R
0.5
 P
L
0.5
    ( 25)  26.9703**  P
C
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 26)  -187.443** 
    (9.106)      (42.751) 
P
R
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 22)  -20.182  P
C
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   ( 36)  736.6729** 
    (10.98)      (189.8) 
P
R
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
   ( 32)  83.2434  (Z
O
0.5
 P
V
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 11)  -38.4212 
    (82.242)      (166.1) 
P
R
0.5
 P
C
0.5
   ( 26)  2.8441  (Z
O
0.5
 P
R
0.5
)
-1
    ( 12)  -10.4423 
    (11.478)      (51.889) 
P
F
0.5
 P
O
0.5
    ( 34)  -364.217**  (Z
O
0.5
 P
F
0.5
)
-1
   ( 13)  -210.513* 
    (58.242)      (93.816) 
P
F
0.5
 P
L
0.5
    ( 35)  151.7786**  (Z
O
0.5
 P
O
0.5
)
-1
   ( 14)  30.2173 
    (52.852)      (450.2) 
P
F
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
   ( 23)  -71.2755**  (Z
O
0.5 
P
L
0.5
 
 
)
-1
   ( 15)  -5.7861 
      (20.264)        (115.1) 
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
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Table A.1 cont. Estimated Parameters from the MLGL Profit System with Standard 
Errors in Parentheses. 
Name  Estimate  Name  Estimate 
(Z
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
)
-1 
  ( 12)  0.0352  (P
F
0.5
 P
O
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 34)  -2718689** 
    (0.062)        (560832) 
(Z
O
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 13)  0.295  (P
F
0.5
 P
L
0.5
  )
-1
   ( 35)  1651730** 
    (1.028)      (546562) 
(Z
O
0.5
 P
C
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 16)  236.4422*  (P
F
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
)
-1
   ( 23)  -170.367* 
    (111.3)      (81.017) 
 (P
V
0.5
  P
R
0.5 
 )
-1
  ( 12)  0  (P
F
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
 )
-1
   ( 33)  12833.26* 
    (0)      (5320.9) 
(P
V
0.5
 P
F
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 13)  19890.22  (P
F
0.5
 P
C
0.5
  )
-1
   ( 36)  0 
    (42062.2)      (0) 
(P
V
0.5
 P
O
0.5
  )
-1
 ( 14)  -99441.2  (P
O
0.5
 P
L
0.5
 )
-1
    ( 45)  -5048924** 
    (73118)      (1343479) 
(P
V
0.5
 P
L
0.5
 )
-1
     ( 15)  38217.49  (P
O
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 24)  1260.688* 
    (33449.7)      (491.3) 
(P
V
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
 ( 22)  7.4826  (P
O
0.5
  Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
  ( 34)  -65118.9** 
    (17.317)      (15766) 
(P
V
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
   ( 32)  -3038.18**  (P
O
0.5
 P
C
0.5
)
-1
      (  46)  1455870 
    (1080.5)      (1295386) 
(P
V
0.5
 P
C
0.5
  )
-1
    ( 16)  103769.9  (P
L
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
    ( 25)  -232.261 
    (65720.4)      (129.9) 
(P
R
0.5
 P
F
0.5
 )
-1
  (  23)  30369.06  (P
L
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
     ( 35)  12789.84 
    (46691.2)      (7271.5) 
(P
R
0.5
 P
O
0.5
  )
-1
  (  24)  -53671.8  (P
L
0.5
 P
C
0.5
  )
-1
     (  56)  678872.9* 
    (72845)      (339253) 
(P
R
0.5
 P
L
0.5
 )
-1
    (  25)  0  (Z
W
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
  ( 23)  -3.3964 
    (0)      (2.07) 
(P
R
0.5
 Z
W
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 22)  -149.692*  ( Z
W
0.5
 P
C
0.5
  )
-1
  ( 26)  -609.72 
    (60.446)      (369.3) 
(P
R
0.5
 Z
M
0.5
 )
-1
  ( 32)  2709.971  (P
C
0.5
  Z
M
0.5
  )
-1
     ( 36)  38104.32** 
    (2619.3)      (7616.2) 
(P
R
0.5
 P
C
0.5
 )
-1
     (  26)  0     
      (0)         
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
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One advantage of the MLGL specification is the ability to impose convexity by restricting the 
squared parameters to be positive. Unfortunately, the regression estimates would not converge 
under these restrictions. Interestingly, the estimates do converge when all variable input 
coefficients are constrained to be non-negative. However, even in this case, profit is not 
consistent with convexity. Clearly the feature of the MLGL that allows easy imposition of 
curvature is not useful when some inputs are quasi-fixed.  
 Another way to impose convexity is to construct a Bayesian prior distribution in the 
region around the predicted values where convexity holds, and limit the regression to this region. 
The first step to doing this is to bootstrap the model around the predicted values and test for the 
convexity of individual observations. Again the number of observations consistent with 
convexity is so small --  never more than 80 observations out of 500 possible, and frequently just 
two or three in each run -- that limiting the analysis to these cases is not likely to be descriptive 
of the sample. It further suggests that imposing convexity using constraints on eigen values may 
not be appropriate. Barnett (2002) warns that imposing curvature often results in violations of 
monotonicity.  
 
A.2  ELASTICITIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
The own and cross price elasticities from equation 3.15, calculated at predicted means, 
are presented in table A.2. As theory prescribes, the own price elasticity of demand for each 
input is negative. All input demand elasticities are elastic. The demand elasticity for fuel is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table A.2. Own and Cross-price Elasticities of Output Supply in Input 
Demand from Equation (3.15).  
Quantity 
Price 
Vegetables 
Price      
Fld Crops 
Price 
Fuel 
Price 
Labor 
Price 
Chemicals 
Vegetables 11.819** 0 21.463 -8.875 -21.068* 
 (4.732) (0) (13.987) (5.271) (10.433) 
Fld Crops  -2.729 -0.929 8.116 0.979 
  (1.627) (0.781) (6.436) (1.147) 
Fuel -- -- -9.888** -1.092 -6.603** 
   (2.575) (0.711) (2.174) 
Labor -- -- -- -877.888 43.185 
    (923.673) (52.233) 
Chemicals -- -- -- -- -1.359 
          (1.363) 
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
 
The price elasticity of supply for vegetables is positive and significant. The supply 
elasticity of field crops is negative, but it is not significant. These are reasonable results, although 
the sign of the supply of field crops is problematic. As is indicated in the previous chapter, 
Williams and Shumway (1998) finds strong support for separability among inputs, but little 
support for separability among many farm outputs. It is possible that the field crop variable 
aggregates crops with different production technologies into one variable. The positive sign of 
the cross-price elasticity of field crops with labor and chemical prices is further evidence of a 
problem with at least one of these variables. The cross-price elasticity of vegetables and field 
crops is zero because the relevant coefficients are bounded at zero by the non-negative 
constraints in the MLGL.
19
   
                                                 
19
  While positive cross-price elasticities of supply are indicative of a problem, it is not definitive. Lopez (1984) 
demonstrates that with multi-product firms the cross-price elasticity is the Marshallian total elasticity, which 
includes a scale effect as well as the Hicksian substitution effect. While the substitution effect should have a 
negative sign, the sign of the scale effect is ambiguous as the change in output price effects different inputs 
differently. Thus when estimating a multi-output profit function for Canadian agriculture, Lopez also finds a positive 
cross-price elasticity for outputs, but when adjusting the analysis to conform to the production possibility frontier, 
the elasticity is estimated to be negative. 
 114 
 
 
Misspecification may also arise from the treatment of inputs. Mishra et al. (2004) make 
the case that labor could well be considered a quasi-fixed variable. In this model, labor acts as a 
substitute for chemicals, which seems reasonable, but is a complement in production to fuel. 
Neither elasticity, however, is statistically significant. Ball (1985) emphasizes the importance of 
controlling for changes in the quality of inputs when analyzing farm production over time. While 
constructing such a data set is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that with the 
introduction of pesticide-resistant crops the structural role of chemicals in agriculture has 
changed considerably over the last twenty-five years. Yet chemicals appear to be well-behaved 
in this model. The own price elasticity of chemicals has the correct sign, and chemicals act as 
compliments to fuel and a substitute for labor. 
The implication is that misspecification of the profit function must arise from the output 
variables. Constructing price indices for each crop reporting district may introduce some noise 
into the profit function. It is possible that using Fisher price indices for each region exaggerates 
the ability of individual farmers to react to price changes. For example, it is conceivable that a 
district that grows a small quantity of field crops could change to a small quantity of a field crop 
that has a relatively high price, thus pulling up the price index and contradicting the own price 
effect. In addition, aggregating many different vegetables into a single measure of vegetable 
price may mask structural differences in vegetable production across regions. This may make it 
difficult to fit a convex function.  
The signs and significance of the cross-price elasticities with respect to the quantity of 
water and the value of machinery are in table A.3.  This table shows that increasing the quantity 
of irrigation water increases the demand for other inputs. These effects are  
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Table A.3. Cross-price Elasticities of Outputs and Inputs 
with Water and Machinery.  
Quantity  Q Water 
Value 
of Machinery 
Vegetables 0.163       0.248 
 (0.301) (0.09) 
Field Crops 0.598 -0.125 
 (5.455) (1.400) 
Fuel 0.063* -0.192 
 (0.031) (0.105) 
Labor 0.019* -0.038 
 (0.022) (0.040) 
Chemicals 0.153** 0.113 
  (0.035) (0.073) 
  A * represents significance at the 5%  level, ** at the 1% level. 
 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, or higher, but they are small in magnitude. A 
ten percent increase in the quantity of water increases the demand for chemicals by 1.5 percent, 
fuel by 0.6 percent, and labor by 0.2 percent. Thus water acts as a compliment to other inputs. To 
the extent that water supply constrains  
output, increasing the quantity of water relaxes the constraint, allowing output to increase along 
with the derived demand for inputs. The positive output elasticities are consistent with this 
interpretation. Surprisingly the supply of vegetables is less sensitive to changes in the quantity of 
water than are field crops. A ten percent increase in the quantity of water increases the supply of 
vegetables by 1.6 percent, versus a six percent increase in the supply of field crops. While 
neither of these terms is statistically significant, this may explain the rapid increase in irrigated 
acreage in regions such as Kansas that grow field crops intensively.  
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The supply of vegetables and the demand for fuel and labor react more vigorously to changes in 
the value of machinery than they do to changes in the quantity of water. The demand for 
chemicals rises with the value of machinery, while, surprisingly, the demand for fuel falls. Labor 
does act as a substitute for machinery, however, in contrast to the water results, none of these are 
significant at the 95% confidence level 
 
A.3  The Translog Profit Function 
 
The estimated coefficients for the translog profit function from equation (3.9) are 
reported in table A.4.  Regional shadow prices of water from equation (3.10) are reported in table 
A.5. Because of the problems with the both the Translog and MLGL profit functions discussed 
above, it is important to point out that the regional water prices are fairly robust, whether 
calculated using the translog or the MLGL. Water values in the tranlog model tend to be lower.  
The overall water value in the translog is nearly identical to its MLGL counterpart. Both 
models also have Georgia and Oklahoma with the highest water values by far. Western states 
generally have the lowest water values, and states in the central U.S. tend to have medium to 
high values. There are some exceptions; water values in Florida are below average in the table 
A.5, whereas they are quite high in the MLGL. Conversely, Oregon and Washington have 
relatively high water values in the translog model. Also, Nebraska‟s water value changes from 
high in the MLGL model to negative here. Although this model has fewer negative water values 
than the MLGL model, they agree that most western states‟ water values are not statistically 
different from zero. 
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Table A.4. Estimated Parameters from the Translog Profit System with Standard 
Errors in Parentheses. 
Name  Estimate  Name   Estimate 
Const ant  
  
10.9645**  LnPo-LnPo   3.6816 
   (3.146)      (11.377) 
LnPv  -2.8097**  LnPo-LnPl   -0.4615 
   (0.33)      (0.49) 
LnPr   -2.2129*  LnPl-LnPl   -0.2957** 
   (1.029)      (0.066) 
LnPf   1.3078**  LnZo   0.467** 
   (0.228)      (0.141) 
LnPo  10.1403  LnZw    -0.3973 
   (6.019)      (0.316) 
LnPl  3.0847**  LnZm    -3.1554** 
   (0.356)      (1.145) 
LnPv-LnPv  0.1625**  LnZo-LnZo   0.0147** 
   (0.041)      (0.005) 
LnPv-LnPr   0.0922  LnZw -LnZo   0.0017 
   (0.071)      (0.007) 
LnPv-LnPf  0.0049  LnZm -LnZo   -0.0861** 
   (0.019)      (0.028) 
LnPv-LnPo  0.6593  LnZw -LnZw    0.0103 
   (0.434)      (0.018) 
LnPv-LnPl  -0.052  LnZw -LnZm     0.0529 
   (0.034)      (0.037) 
LnPr-LnPr   0.2211  LnZm -LnZm    0.7326** 
   (0.213)      (0.216) 
LnPr-LnPf   -0.0388  LnZo-LnPv   0.0455** 
   (0.047)      (0.008) 
LnPr-LnPo  2.1024  LnZo-LnPr    -0.0492 
   (1.429)      (0.028) 
LnPr-LnPl  -0.0518  LnZo-LnPf   0.0063 
   (0.075)      (0.006) 
LnPf -LnPf   -0.1656**  LnZo-LnPo   -0.3303* 
   (0.026)      (0.16) 
LnPf -LnPo  -0.4032  LnZo-LnPl   -0.0288** 
   (0.315)      (0.009) 
LnPf -LnPl  0.0238  LnZw -LnPv   -0.0094 
     (0.031)          (0.014) 
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
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Table A.4. Cont. Estimated Parameters from the Translog Profit System with 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Name  Estimate  Name  Estimate 
LnZw -LnPr    -0.0789  
W Hold ing 
Capacit y  0.0683 
    (0.042)      (0.072) 
LnZw -LnPf   0.0065  Land Slope  -0.0521 
    (0.009)      (0.055) 
LnZw -LnPo   1.0303**  Organic Mat t er   0.0464 
    (0.282)      (0.072) 
LnZw -LnPl   -0.0113  
Num b of  
Exchanges  -0.0475 
    (0.015)      (0.034) 
LnZm -LnPv   0.4346**  Share Gravit y Ir r   0.0207 
    (0.062)      (0.023) 
LnZm -LnPr   0.4965**  
Share 
Groundw at er   0.0051 
    (0.19)      (0.014) 
LnZm -LnPf   -0.2125**  Precip it at ion   0.0164 
    (0.042)      (0.114) 
LnZm -LnPo   -1.2739  Tem perat ure  -0.2095 
    (1.142)      (0.203) 
LnZm -LnPl    -0.4895**     
       (0.066)          
A * represents significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. 
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 Table A.5. Shadow Price of Water at 
Predicted Mean Values by State From 
Translog Model. 
State  MVP Water 
  $/Acre-foot 
Total  45.14 
Arizona  11.27 
Arkansas  21.98 
California  29.08 
Colorado  17.56 
Florida  35.39 
Georgia  234.25 
Idaho  10.68 
Kansas  30.94 
Louisiana  15.19 
Mississippi  70.41 
Montana  -13.68 
Nebraska  -5.44 
Nevada  3.55 
New Mexico  18.09 
Oklahoma  178.74 
Oregon  52.57 
Texas  55.38 
Utah  7.06 
Washington  75.98 
Wyoming   4.06 
 120 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adams, Jennifer, Dotti Crews, and Ronald Cummings.2004. “The Sale and Leasing of Water 
Rights In Western States: An Update to Mid-2003.” Water Policy Working Paper #2004-
004. North Georgia Planning and Policy Center, Georgia State Univ. 
 
Allen, R.C. and W.E. Diewert. 1981. “Direct versus Implicit Superlative Index Number 
Formulae”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 63, 430-435. 
 
Ayer, Harry, W. 1983. “Crop Water Production Functions for Potatoes and Dried Beans in 
Idaho.” USDA ERS Report No. AGES-830302, Washington, D.C. 
 
Ball, Eldon. 1985. “Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement in U.S. Agriculture, 1848-79.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67:475-486. 
 
Ball, V. Eldon, Jean-Christophe Bureau, Jean-Pierre Butault, and Richard Nehring. 2001. 
“Levels of Farm Sector Productivity: An International Comparison.” Journal of 
Productivity Analysis 15:5-29. 
 
Barnett, William A. 2002. “Tastes and Technology: Curvature is not Sufficient for Regularity.” 
Journal of Econometrics 108: 199-202. 
 
Barnett, William A. 1983. “New Indices of Money Supply and the Flexible Laurent Demand 
System.” Journal of Business Statistics 1: 7-23. 
 
Barnett, William A., Yul W. Lee, and Michael E. Wolfe. 1985. “The Three-Dimensional Global 
Properties of the Minflex Laurent, Generalized Leontief, and Translog Flexible 
Functional Forms.” Journal of Econometrics 30: 3-31. 
 
Barnett, William A., and Lee, Yul W. 1985. “The Global Properties of the Minflex Laurent, 
Generalized Leontief, and Translog Flexible Functional Forms.” Econometrica 53(6): 
1421-37. 
 
Beare, Stephen C., Rosalyn Bell, and Brian S. Fisher. 1998. “Determining the Value of Water: 
The Role of Risk, Infrastructure Constraints, and Ownership.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 80:916-940.  
 
 121 
 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., Arvind Panagariya, and T. N. Srinivasan. 1998. Lectures on International 
Trade. Second Edition. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Bliss, Christopher J. 1975. Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income. Amsterdam 
and New York: Elsevier North-Holland. 
 
Blackorby, Charles, Daniel Primont, and R. Robert Russell. 1977. “On Testing Separability 
Restrictions With Flexible Functional Forms.” Journal of Econometrics 5: 195-209. 
 
Booker, J. F. and R. A. Young. 1994. “Modeling Intrastate And Interstate Markets For Colorado 
River Water Resources.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26: 66-
87. 
 
Caswell, M. and David Zilberman. 1985. “The Choice of Irrigation Technologies in California.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67:224-234. 
 
Caves, D. W., and L.R. Christensen. 1980. “Global Properties of Flexible Functional Forms.” 
American Economic Review 70:422-432. 
 
Chalfant, James A. 1984. “Comparisons of Alternative Functional Forms with Applications to 
Agricultural Input Data.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66:216-220. 
 
Chambers, Robert G. 1988. Applied Production Analysis.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Chambers, Robert G.; Vasavada, Utpal. 1983. ”Testing Asset Fixity for U.S Agriculture.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65:761-69. 
 
Christensen, L., and D. Jorgenson. 1970. “U.S. Real Product and Real Factor Input, 1929-1967.” 
Review of Income and Wealth 16:19-50. 
 
Christensen, L., D. Jorgenson, and L. Lau. 1975. “Transcendental Logarithmic Utility 
Functions.” American Economic Review 65: 367–83. 
 
Coelli, T., J. Lloyd-Smith, D. Morrison, and J. Thomas. 1991. “Hedonic Pricing For a Cost 
Benefit Analysis of a Public Water Supply Scheme.” The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 35(1): 1-19. 
 122 
 
 
 
Davis, George C., Ni Lin, C. Richard Shumway. “Aggregation Without Separability: Tests of the 
United States and Mexican Agricultural Production Data.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 82: 214-30. 
 
Deardorff, Allen V. 1994. “The Possibility of Factor Price Equalization, Revisited.” Journal of 
International Economics, 36: 167-175.  
 
Denny, Michael and Melvyn Fuss. 1977. “The Use Of Approximation Analysis To Test For 
Separability And The Existence Of Consistent Aggregates.” The American Economic 
Review 67(3): 404-18. 
 
Diewert,W. E. 1978. “Superlative Index Numbers and Consistency in Aggregation.” 
Econometrica, 4: 883-900. 
 
Dunford, Richard W., Carole E. Marti, and Ronald C. Mittelhammer. 1985. “A Case Study of 
Rural Land Prices at the Urban Fringe Including Subjective Buyer Expectations.” Land 
Economics 61(1): 10-16. 
 
Edwards, Brian K., Richard E. Howitt, and Silvio J. Flaim. 1996. “Fuel, Crop, and Water 
Substitution in Irrigated Agriculture.” Resource and Energy Economics 18: 311-31. 
 
Environmental Policy and Information Center. 2002. Jacksonville State University. Retrieved 
November, 2002.  <http://www.jsu.edu/depart/epic/ACT.htm>.  
 
Epstein, Larry G. 1983. “Aggregating Quasi-fixed Factors.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
85(2): 191-205. 
 
Fadali, Elizabeth and W. Douglass Shaw. 1998. “Can Recreation Values For A Lake Constitute 
A Market For Banked Agricultural Water?” Western Economics Association 
International  XVI: 433-41. 
 
Faux, John and Gregory M. Perry. 1999. “Estimating Irrigation Water Value Using Hedonic 
Price Analysis: A Case Study in Malheur County, Oregon.” Land Economics 75(3): 440-
52. 
 
 
 123 
 
 
Fisher, Douglas, Adrian R. Fleissig, and Apostolos Serletis. 2001. “An Empirical Comparison of 
Flexible Functional Forms.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 16: 59-80.  
 
Frederick, Kenneth D., Tim VandenBerg, and Jean Hanson. 1996. “Economic Values Of 
Freshwater in the United States.” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 97-03. 
 
Gallant, A. Ronald (1984), "The Fourier Flexible Form," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 66: 204--208. 
 
Gardner, B. Delworth. 1983. “Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California Agriculture.” in 
Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment, ed., Terry 
L. Anderson, pp.83-115. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.  
 
Giannakas, Konstantinos, Kien C. Tran, and Vangelis Tzouvelekas. 2003. “On the Choice of 
Functional Form in Stochastic Frontier Modeling.” Empirical Economics 28: 75-100. 
 
Gibbons, Diana C.1986. The Economic Value of Water.  A Study from Resources for the Future, 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
 
Gollehon, Noel. 2002. “Water Use and Pricing.” USDA Briefing Room, R. 
 
Gollehon, Noel and William Quinby. 2000. “Irrigation In The American West: Water And 
Economic Activity.” Water Resources Development 16(2): 187-95. 
 
Hansen, LeRoy T. and Arne Hallam. 1990. “National Estimates of the Recreational Value of 
Streamflow, Water Allocation Tradeoffs: Irrigation and Recreation.” USDA ERS No. 
634.  
 
Hexem, Roger W., and Earl O. Heady. 1978. Water Production Functions for Irrigated 
Agriculture. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press.  
 
Howitt, R. E., and J. R. Lund. 1999. “The Economic Impacts of Water based ESA and 
Environmental Policies in California.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
81:1268-1272 
 
 124 
 
 
Huffaker, Ray; Whittlesey, N. and Joel R. Hamilton. 2000. “The role of prior appropriation in 
allocating water resources into the 21st century.” Water Resource Development 16(2): 
265-73. 
 
Just, R.E., D. Zilberman, E. Hochman, and Z. Bar-Shira. 1990. “Input Allocation in Multicrop 
Systems.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72:200-209. 
 
Kulatilaka, Nalin.1985. “Tests on the Validity of Static Equilibrium Models”  Journal of 
Econometrics  28: 253-268. 
 
Lau, Lawrence J. 1979. “On Exact Index Numbers.” The Review of Economics and Statistics. 61: 
73-82. 
 
Lee, Donna J. and Richard E. Howitt. 1996. “Modeling Regional Agricultural Production and 
Salinity Control Alternatives for Water Quality Policy Analysis.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78:41-53. 
 
Lewbel, A. 1996.  “Aggregation without Separability: A Generalized Composite Commodity 
Theorem.”  American Economic Review. 86: 524-43. 
 
Lopez, Ramon E. 1985. “Structural Implications of A Class of Flexible Functional Forms For 
Profit Functions.” International Economic Review 26(3): 593-601. 
 
--------. 1984. “Estimating Substitution and Expansion Effects Using a Profit Function 
Framework.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66(3): 358-67. 
Lynne, Gary D. 1978. “Issues and Problems in Agricultural Water Demand Estimation From 
Secondary Data Sources.” Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 10: 101-4. 
 
Mishra, Ashok, C. Moss, and K. Erickson. 2004. “Valuing Farmland With Multiple Quasi-Fixed 
Inputs.” Applied Economics, 36(1): 1669-1676. 
 
Moore, Michael R. 1999. “Estimating Irrigators Ability to Pay for Reclamation Water.” Land 
Economics 75(4):562-578. 
 
Moore, Michael R., Noel R. Gollehon, and Marc B. Carey. 1994. “Alternative Models of Input 
Allocation In Multicrop Systems: Irrigation Water in the Central Plains, United States.” 
Agricultural Economics 11: 143-58. 
 125 
 
 
 
____________. 1994. Multicrop Production Decisions in Western Irrigated Agriculture: The 
Role of Water Price.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76:859-874. 
 
Moss, Charles B. 2000. “Estimation of the Cobb-Douglas with Zero Input Levels: Bootstrapping 
and Substitution.”  Applied Economic Letters 7:677-679. 
 
Moss, Charles B., and Chris de Bodisco. 1998. “Historical Agricultural Water Use in the 
Northwest Florida Water Management District, 1975-1995.”  Grant Report to the 
Northwest Florida Water Management District. 
 
O‟Donnell, Christopher J., C. Richard Shumway, and V. Eldon Ball. 1999. “Input Demands and 
Inefficiency in U. S. Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81:865-
80. 
 
Pope, Rulon D. 1984 “Estimating Functional Forms with Special Reference to Agriculture: 
Discussion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 223-224 
 
Ohyama, Michihiro. 1989. “Factor Endowments and the Pattern of Commodity and Factor 
Trade.” Keio Economic Studies 25:19-29. 
 
Quiroga, Ricardo E. and Boris E. Bravo-Ureta. 1992. “Short and Long-Run Adjustments in 
Dairy Production: A Profit Function Analysis.” Applied Economics 24:607-616. 
 
Renzetti, Steven. 2002. The Economics of Water Demands. Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
 
Ruttan, Vernon W. 1965. The Economic Demand for Irrigated Acreage: New Methodology and 
Some Preliminary Projections, 1954-1980. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for 
Resources for the Future. 
 
Saliba, Bonnie Colby, and David B. Bush. 1987. Water Markets in Theory and Practice: Market 
Transfers, Water Values, and Public Policy. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Schaible, Glenn D. 1997. “Water Conservation Policy Analysis: An Interregional, Multi-Output, 
Primal-Dual Optimization Approach.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
79:163-177. 
 126 
 
 
 
Schankerman, Mark, and M. Ishaq Nadiri. 1986. “A Test of Static Equilibrium Models and Rates 
of Return to Quasi-fixed Factors, With an Application to the Bell System.” Journal of 
Econometrics 33: 97-118. 
 
Schmandt, Jurgen , Ernest Smerdon, and Judith Clarkson. 1988. State Water Policies: A Study of 
Six States. New York: Praeger Publishing. 
 
Schmitz, Troy G., Andrew Schmitz, and Chris Dumas. 1997. “Gains from Trade, Inefficiency of 
Government Programs, and the Net Economic Effects of Trading.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 105: 637-647. 
 
Shumway, C. R. 1973. “Derived Demand for Irrigation Water: The California Aqueduct.” 
Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 5:195-200. 
 
Squires, Dale. 1987. “Long-Run Profit Functions for Multiproduct Firms.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 69:558-569. 
 
Taylor, Timothy G., and Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes. 1990. “A Test of Asset Fixity in 
Southeastern U.S. Agriculture.” Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 22: 105-
111. 
 
Theil, Henri, C.-F. Chung and James L. Seale, Jr. 1989. International Evidence on Consumption 
Patterns.  Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, Inc.,  
 
Thompson, Gary D. 1988. “Choice Of Flexible Functional Forms: Review And Appraisal.” 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 13(2): 169-83. 
 
Thompson, Gary D., and Langworthy, Mark. 1989. “Profit Function Approximations and Duality 
Applications to Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71:791-98. 
 
Torell, L. Allen, James D. Libbin, and Michael D. Miller. 1990. “The Market Value of Water in 
the Ogallala Aquifer.” Land Economics 66(2): 163-75. 
 
USDA/Census.  1997. “Farm Income Data.”  Washington, DC. 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/  
 
 127 
 
 
USDA/ERS.  2000. “Farm Income Data.”  Washington, DC. 
<http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/FarmIncome/finfidmu.htm>. 
 
USDA/NASS.  2000. “Crops County Data.”  Washington, DC. 
<http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/histdata.htm>. 
 
USDA/NASS. 2000. “Historical Data.” Washington, D.C. 
<http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/histdata.htm>. 
 
USDA/NASS.  2000. “Prices Received by Farmers.”  Washington, DC. 
<http://www.usda.gov/nass/aggraphs/agpricet.htm>. 
 
Veeman, T.S., M.M. Veeman, W.L. Adamowicz, S. Royer, B. Viney, R. Freeman, and J. Baggs. 
“Conserving Water in Irrigated Agriculture: The Economics and Valuation of Water 
Rights.” Rural Economy Project Report 97-01. Edmonton: Department of Rural 
Economy, University of Alberta. 
 
Wales, T. 1977. “On the Flexibility of Flexible Functional Forms.” Journal of Econometrics  
5:183-93. 
 
Weatherford, Gary D. ed. 1982. Water and Agriculture in the Western U.S. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
 
White, Halbert. 1980. “Using Least Squares to Approximate Unknown Regression Functions.” 
International Economic Review 21:149-170. 
 
Williams, Shon P., and C. Richard Shumway. 2000. “Aggregation Without Separability: Tests of 
the United States and Mexican Production Data.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 82:214-30. 
 
-------------. 1998. “Testing for Behavioral Objective and Aggregation Opportunities in U.S. 
Agricultural Data.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80:195-207. 
 
Yaron, Dan and Ariel Dinar, 1982. “Optimal Allocation Of Farm Irrigation Water During Peak 
Seasons.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics November: 681-89. 
 
 128 
 
 
Yu, Eden S. H. and Amar K. Parai. 1989. “Factor Immobility and Gains From Trade.” Southern 
Economic Journal 21:601-609. 
 
 
 
